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INTRODUCTION
On December 22, 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 19951 ("Reform Act") in a bipartisan effort to
curb abusive securities litigation. The Reform Act introduced major
revisions to the Securities Act of 19332 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 19343 ("1934 Act") in an effort to achieve an optimal balance 4
between protecting investors from fraud and preventing the increase
1 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C. (Supp. II 1996)).
2 Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77a-
77aa (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
3 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78a-78mm (1994 & Supp. H 1996)). Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 during the Great Depression in order to "pro-
mote investor confidence in the United States securities markets and thereby to encourage
the investment necessary for capital formation, economic growth, and job creation." S.
REP. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683. The Great Depres-
sion was marked by many deceptive practices by issuers against investors. See Louis Loss &
JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 7-8 (3d ed. 1995). For a good
summary of the history and variety of these deceptive practices, see id. at 1-54 (1995);
BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DowN WALL STREET 45-53 (1996). The federal secur-
ities laws attempt to prevent the use of such devices and the resulting fraud by ensuring
that all material information pertaining to a security or issuing company is fully disclosed
to investors. See Loss & SEUGMAN, supra, at 34. The Securities Act of 1933 is concerned
with the initial distribution of securities, whereas the 1934 Act deals primarily with the
subsequent trading of securities. See id.
4 See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683 (stating
that the purpose behind the Reform Act is to "lower the cost of raising capital by combat-
ting [securities litigation] abuses, while maintaining the incentive for bringing meritorious
actions"); see also Richard M. Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995: Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs, Defend-
ants and Lawyers, 51 Bus. LAw. 1009, 1009 (1996). Phillips and Miller suggest that
[a] properly balanced system would give appropriate weight to two compet-
ing interests: the interest in deterring securities fraud and remedying it
when it occurs, and the interest in assuring that the litigation process is not
used for abusive purposes and does not unfairly target defendants who are
guilty of no wrongdoing
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in the cost of capital that results from the now infamous "strike suit."5
A strike suit occurs when a plaintiffs' attorney files a class-action law-
suit6 on behalf of a corporation's shareholders following a sudden de-
cline in the value of the company's stock. The attorney brings the suit
not as a faithful representative of the plaintiff class, but primarily for
its settlement value.7 According to proponents of the Reform Act,
strike suits ultimately benefit the plaintiffs' lawyer at the expense of
both the corporate defendant and the plaintiff-shareholder class.8
The Reform Act seeks to curb these abusive lawsuits by making it more
difficult for plaintiffs' lawyers to take advantage of the general an-
tifraud provision of the federal securities laws-section 10b of the
1934 Act9 and Rule 10b-510 promulgated thereunder.
5 Black's Law Dictionary defines "strike suit" as a "[s]hareholder derivative action be-
gun with [the] hope of winning large attorney fees or private settlements, and with no
intention of benefiting [the] corporation on behalf of which [the] suit is theoretically
brought." BLAC's LAW DiCrIoNARY 1423 (6th ed. 1990).
6 Due to the high cost of litigation and the small stake of the typical investor, federal
securities fraud actions are almost always brought as class actions under Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure See 10 Louis Loss & JOEL SEUGMAN, SEcuRMIES REGULATION
4605-08 (3d ed. 1996).
7 The Reform Act congressional committee hearings and floor debates abound with
tales of abuse via the "strike suit." For a good summary of the typical "strike suit" see H.R.
REP. No. 104-50 (1995), reprinted inJAMEs D. Cox ET AL., SEcuRmES REGULATION 724-26 (2d
ed. 1997). The complaints filed in strike suits are typically based on only minimal investiga-
tion and plead the most general allegations. See i&L at 725. Having initiated a suit, the
plaintiffs' lawyer typically uses numerous scare tactics unrelated to the underlying merits of
the case, such as initiating extensive and costly discovery requests or raising the specter of
huge judgment awards and negative publicity, to force the defendant company to settle. See
id.
'With relatively little specific evidence other than a drop in stock price, the
plaintiffs have succeeded in filing a lawsuit, triggering the costly discovery
process, and imposing massive costs on the defendant who possesses the
bulk of the relevant information....
As the costs of discovery rise, the pressure to settle becomes enormous.
Many cases settle before the completion of discovery.
Id.
8 See H.R. REP. No. 104-50 (1995), reprinted in Cox ET AL., supra note 7, at 725 ("The
plaintiffs' lawyers take one third of the settlement, and the rest is distributed to the mem-
bers of the class, resulting in pennies of return for each individual plaintiff.").
9 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994). Section 10(b)
provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
Id.
10 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998). Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") Rule
lOb-5 was promulgated by the SEC in 1948 and further refines the phrase "manipulative
and deceptive device" contained in section 10b. Rule 1O-5 provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person...
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The mainstay provision of the Reform Act,'1 section 21D(b) (2),12
attempts to deter strike suits at the pleading stage of litigation. 13 This
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id. The Supreme Court has described Rule lob-5 as a "catch-all" provision. See Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976). Rule lOb-5 "properly proscribes all fraud
that touches on the purchase or sale of a security," and "stands as the centerpiece antifraud
provision under the federal securities laws." Cox Er AL., supra note 7, at 682.
To establish a valid claim under Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant:
(1) made a material misrepresentation or omission, (2) in connection with the purchase or
sale of a security, (3) with scienter, (4) that the plaintiff relied on this misrepresentation or
omission, and (5) that this reliance caused the plaintiff's injury. See, e.g., Pits, Ltd. v. Ameri-
can Express Bank Int'l, 911 F. Supp. 710, 715-16 (S.D.N.Y 1996).
11 The Reform Act includes provisions designed to thwart the strike suit at every stage
of litigation. In order to slow the "race to the courthouse," and to prevent the use of profes-
sional plaintiffs, Congress enacted a provision that requires the court to appoint "the most
adequate plaintiff" as lead plaintiff. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a) (3) (B), 78u-4(a) (3) (B)
(Supp. II 1996). The Reform Act creates further disincentives for plaintiffs' lawyers by lim-
iting the lead plaintiffs recovery to his pro rata share of any final judgment or settlement,
see 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1 (a) (4), 78u-4(a) (4), and by prohibiting persons other than institu-
tional investors from serving as lead plaintiff more than five times in three years, see 15
U.S.C. §§ 77z-1 (a) (3) (B) (vi), 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (vi). Whereas prior to the Reform Act sanc-
tions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were at the judge's discretion, see
FED. R. Crv. P. 11 (c), the Reform Act makes judicial review and imposition of sanctions for
frivolous complaints mandatory. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1 (c), 78u-4(c). With regard to for-
ward-looking statements contained in prospectuses, primary targets for class action securi-
ties suits, Congress eliminated liability for recklessness, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(c) (1) (B) (i),
78u-5(c) (1) (B) (i), and further enacted a provision codifying the "bespeaks caution" doc-
trine, which extends a "safe harbor" for both written and oral forward-looking statements
accompanied by "meaningful cautionary statements." 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(c) (1) (A) (i), 78u-
5 (c) (1) (A) (i). See generally Phillips & Miller, supra note 4, at 1015-16 (discussing the
changes implemented by the Reform Act to curb speculative class action suits). For a study
surveying the current state ofjudicial reception with regard to each of these provisions, see
TEN THINGS WE KNOw AND TEN THINGS WE DON'T KNow ABOUT THE PRIVATE SECURITIES
LITIGATION REFoRM ACr OF 1995 (1997) (testimony ofJoseph A. Grundfest and Michael A.
Perino), reprinted in, 1 29TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION, at 301, 307-08
(PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-1022, 1997) [hereinafter TEN
THINGS].
12 Section 21D(b) (2) reads:
REQUIRED STATE OF MIND.-In any private action arising under this title in
which the plaintiff may recover money damages only on proof that the de-
fendant acted with a particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with re-
spect to each act or omission alleged to violate this title, state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted
with the required state of mind.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2) (Supp. II 1996). Because Rule 10b-5 is the only 1934 Act liability
provision that can be brought privately (i.e., by parties other than the Securities Exchange
Commission), and which requires the plaintiff to establish that the defendant acted with a
particular state of mind, see 8 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 6, at 3653-54, by its language,
section 21D(b) (2) applies only to securities fraud actions brought under Rule 10b-5.




provision, the subject of extensive and heated congressional debate, 14
heightens the requirements for pleading the scienter, or mental state,
element of a securities fraud action brought under Rule lOb-5,
thereby making it more difficult for a complaint to survive a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
("FRCP").15 Aptly comparing the reform legislation to "wet clay," Pro-
fessor John Coffee observed that the ultimate fate of the Reform Act
lies with the federal courts, "the master sculptor ... that will spell the
difference between high art and merely competent mediocrity.' 6
Thus far, the federal district courts' nonuniform treatment of section
21D (b) (2) has more closely resembled an art student's midterm than
a Michelangelo.' 7
The current confusion among the federal district courts centers
on exactly how stringent Congress intended section 21D (b) (2) 's
"strong inference" pleading standard to be. The thirty-one' 8 federal
district courts that have interpreted section 21D(b) (2) to date have
employed various interpretive strategies, contradictory Supreme
Court precedent on statutory interpretation, and different pieces of
the Reform Act's circuitous legislative history.1 9 As a result, the courts
have arrived at, not one, but three distinct pleading standards. Ap-
proximately half of the courts to interpret section 21D(b) (2) have
held that it roughly codified the Second Circuit's "strong inference"
pleading standard in its entirety.20 The remaining courts have inter-
preted section 21D(b) (2) to have borrowed the "strong inference"
language from the Second Circuit, but view the language as having
modified the tests21 developed therein for determining whether a
"strong inference" has been successfully pled.2 2 As a result, these
courts have created a more stringent standard than that of the Second
Circuit. Of these courts, one group has interpreted section 21D (b) (2)
to have eliminated the presumption that satisfying one of the Second
Circuit's two tests-the "motive and opportunity"-creates a strong
inference of scienter.23 Even more disconcerting, the second group
of these courts has interpreted section 21D (b) (2) both to have eradi-
14 For an in depth discussion of the legislative history leading to the enactment of the
Reform Act, see infra Part II.
15 See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
16 John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or, Why the
Fat Lady Has Not Yet Sung, 51 Bus. LAw. 975, 975 (1996).
17 See TEN THiNGs, supra note 11, at 301.
18 This number is based upon the Note writer's research as of September 1, 1998.
19 As Professor Coffee noted, "the more closely that one examines the legislative his-
tory on this point, the murkier the issue gets." Coffee, supra note 16, at 980.
20 See infra Part III.B.1.
21 The Second Circuit's two alternative tests are laid out in detail infra Part I.B.3.
22 See infra Part III.B.2.
23 See infra Part III.B.2(a).
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cated the Second Circuit's motive and opportunity test and, by mis-
construing the Second Circuit's second possible test, to have
eliminated securities fraud liability for recklessness.2 4 By holding that
a complaint must now plead facts establishing that the defendant ac-
,ted with "conscious knowledge," these courts have modified not only
the pleading requirements but also the substantive requirements of
Rule 10b-5 securities fraud actions.
This Note explores how the federal district courts have inter-
preted one provision of the Reform Act to radically transform the
pleading and scienter standards for federal securities litigation, and it
attempts to clarify the present confusion concerning this provision.
Part I provides a detailed introduction to the three different standards
that the district courts have derived from section 21D(b) (2), clarifies
the distinction between procedural and substantive law that has
eluded several district courts, and describes the pre-Reform Act
pleading requirements for the scienter element of securities fraud
under Rule 10b-5. Part II discusses the legislative history behind sec-
tion 21D(b)(2), and seeks to present a comprehensive guide for
judges and legal practitioners faced with section 21D(b) (2) in the fu-
ture. Part II closely tracks the development of the heightened stan-
dard for pleading scienter from the introduction of the Reform Act
bill in each house of Congress to floor discussion preceding the con-
gressional override of President Clinton's veto. Part III surveys the
thirty-one district court cases that have interpreted section 21D (b) (2)
to date. This Part identifies the three distinct pleading standards the
courts have developed and analyzes the main interpretive arguments
that each court has employed. Part IV evaluates the district courts'
interpretive arguments in light of the text of both section 21D(b) (2)
and related Reform Act provisions, in light of the legislative history
behind section 21D(b) (2), and in light of the larger policy goals of
both the Reform Act and the federal securities laws. Part IV con-
cludes that section 21D (b) (2) does not alter the substantive scienter
requirements for securities fraud and that, as to the precise stringency
of section 21D(b)(2)'s pleading standard, the text of the provision
must ultimately control.
24 See infra Part III.B.2(b). It is crucial to understand the analytical distinction be-
tween a procedural and a substantive requirement. To restate the point: one group of
courts has interpreted section 21D (b) (2) to have altered not simply what a complaint must
plead with regard to the defendant's state of mind in order to survive a FRCP 12(b) (6)
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, but also what a plaintiff must prove at trial
with respect to the defendant's state of mind in order to succeed on the merits. For further





A. Section 21D(b)(2): The Heightened Pleading Standard
for Scienter
A complaint alleging securities fraud under the federal securities
laws must comply with the requirements of FRCP Rule 9 (b).25 Prior
to the passage of the Reform Act, the federal courts of appeals had
applied widely divergent interpretations of FRCP Rule 9 (b) 's require-
ment that, in fraud actions, "[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other
condition of mind of a person may be averred generally."26 The great-
est divergence in application of FRCP Rule 9(b) was between the
Ninth and the Second Circuits. 27 Under pre-Reform Act Ninth Cir-
cuit law, in order to survive a FRCP Rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss, a
plaintiff could plead the scienter element of a Rule 10b-5 securities
fraud action with mere conclusory allegations.28 By contrast, Second
Circuit law required a plaintiff's complaint to plead specific facts suffi-
cient to establish a "strong inference" of scienter.2 9
In an attempt to create uniformity among the circuits30 and to
"establish... more stringent pleading requirements to curtail the fil-
ing of meritless lawsuits,"31 the Reform Act added section 21D(b) (2)
to the 1934 Act, which provides:
25 FRCP 9(b) provides: "In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances con-
stituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and
other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally." FED. R. Crv. P. 9(b). SEC
Chairman Arthur Levitt characterized FRCP 9(b), during Senate Subcommittee hearings,
as follows:
This... provision recognizes that, while it is fair to require a plaintiff to
allege with some specificity what a defendant did and why it was fraudulent,
it is unrealistic to expect a plaintiff, at the commencement of an action, to
be able to present facts specifically demonstrating that a defendant acted
with the requisite state of mind.
Securities Litigation Reform Proposals: Hearings on S. 240, S. 667, and H.R. 1058 Before the Sub-
comm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong.
248 (1995) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC).
26 FED. R. Crv. P. 9(b); seeH.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740.
27 See Senate Hearings, supra note 25, at 248-49 (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman,
SEC)
28 See In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1545-47 (9th Cir. 1994); see also
Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1082 n.4 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that under the GlenFed
standard a plaintiff "need 'simply ... say[ ] that scienter existed' to satisfy the requirements
of Rule 9(b)" (quoting Glenfed, 42 F.3d at 1547)).
29 See In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268 (2d Cir. 1993). Approxi-
mately three other circuits have followed the Second Circuit's approach. See Tuchman v.
DSC Comm. Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1068 (5th Cir. 1994); Greenstone v. Cambex Corp., 975
F.2d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 1992); DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629-30 (7th Cir. 1990).





REQUIRED STATE OF MIND.- In any private action arising under this
chapter in which the plaintiff may recover money damages only on
proof that the defendant acted with a particular state of mind, the
complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged to vio-
late this chapter, state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of
mind.3 2
According to the House Conference Report on the Reform Act, Con-
gress wrote section 21D(b) (2) to conform to the "with particularity"
language found in the first sentence of FRCP Rule 9(b),33 and also
based the section's language, "in part," on the scienter pleading stan-
dard developed in the Second Circuit.3 4 The current confusion
among the district courts stems from uncertainty over exactly how
stringent Congress intended section 21D(b)(2)'s "strong inference"
standard to be. The statutory language of section 21D(b) (2) neither
sets out a definition of the term "strong inference," nor provides any
guidance as to precisely what a plaintiff must plead in order to estab-
lish a strong inference of scienter. Although the provision borrows
language from the Second Circuit's strong inference pleading stan-
dard, the text of section 21D (b) (2) does not explicitly incorporate the
tests for establishing a strong inference developed in Second Circuit
case law. According to the Second Circuit's tests, a plaintiff may plead
a "strong inference" by alleging either "facts establishing a motive to
commit fraud and an opportunity to do so,"35 or, alternatively, "facts
constituting circumstantial evidence of either reckless or conscious
behavior."3 6
Explanatory language in the House Conference Report, the start-
ing point for a majority of the court decisions that this Note discusses,
is indicative of the equivocal nature of the legislative history and has
proven to be a primary source of the confusion surrounding section
21D(b) (2):
Regarded as the most stringent pleading standard, the Second Cir-
cuit requirement is that the plaintiff state facts with particularity,
and that these facts, in turn, must give rise to a "strong inference" of
the defendant's fraudulent intent. Because the Conference Committee
intends to strengthen existing pleading requirements, it does not intend to
codify the Second Circuit's case law interpreting this pleading standard.37
32 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2) (Supp. II 1996) The Reform Act also strengthens the stan-
dard for pleading the circumstances relating to fraudulent misrepresentation (i.e., the first
sentence of Rule 9(b)). See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (1).
33 For the text of FRCP Rule 9(b), see supra note 25.
34 H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A-N. 730, 740.
35 See In re Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 268-69.
36 Id. Part I.B.3 infra discusses in detail the Second Circuit's "strong inference" stan-
dard, and the two alternative tests developed in that Circuit's case law.
37 H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995), repinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.N. 730, 740
(emphasis added). One court has described the Reform Act's legislative history as "a rich
[Vol. 84:193
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In the footnote accompanying this statement, the Conference Report
states: "For this reason, the Conference Report chose not to include in
the pleading standard certain language relating to motive, opportunity,
or recklessness."38 This passage and the accompanying footnote, in
combination with several other key parts of the Reform Act's legisla-
tive history, have raised several related questions. Did Congress in-
tend the stringency of section 21D (b) (2) 's strong inference pleading
standard to be roughly equivalent to the Second Circuit's standard, as
measured by the alternative tests developed in Second Circuit case
law? Alternatively, by adopting the "strong inference" language from
the Second Circuit's pleading standard without expressly codifying
Second Circuit case law, did Congress intend the provision to be more
stringent than the Second Circuit's standard? Moreover, if Congress
did indeed intend section 21D(b) (2) to be more stringent than the
Second Circuit's strong inference pleading standard, as interpreted in
Second Circuit case law, exactly how stringent is it to be? In enacting
section 21D (b) (2), did Congress intend to raise the scienter pleading
standard by eliminating the Second Circuit's first test for establishing
a strong inference, such that a complaint alleging "motive and oppor-
tunity" would no longer necessarily be sufficient? Or did Congress
intend not only to eliminate the first test but also to modify the Sec-
ond Circuit's second possible test by prohibiting the pleading of reck-
lessness, in effect changing the substantive requirements of securities
fraud?
The courts are roughly split as to the first question. Of the thirty-
one cases this Note examines, courts in sixteen of the cases have inter-
preted section 21D(b) (2) to be more or less a codification of the Sec-
ond Circuit standard and have concluded that satisfaction of either
Second Circuit test per se establishes -a "strong inference."39 Courts in
the remaining fifteen cases have interpreted section 21D(b) (2) to be
more stringent than the Second Circuit standard. Eight of these fif-
teen courts have taken a middle ground and have held that the Re-
form Act simply eliminated the presumption that satisfying the
"motive and opportunity" test suffices to establish a strong inference
of scienter.40 The remaining six courts have offered extreme interpre-
tations of the Reform Act's legislative history and have held that Con-
gress intended to heighten the scienter pleading standard by
abrogating the "motive and opportunity" test and by eliminating Rule
cornucopia... on which courts of every appetite can feed." In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F.
Supp. 238, 242 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
38 Id. at 4 n.23 (emphasis added).
39 Part III.B.1 infra discusses this line of cases.
40 Part III.B.2(a) infra discusses this line of cases. Another case, Novak v. Kasaks, 997
F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), though arriving at a standard that closely resembles that of
the second line of cases, in fact arrives at a standard that shares aspects of both the second
and third lines of cases. Novak is discussed supra note 201.
1998]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
lOb-5 liability for reckless conduct. In other words, these courts have
held that section 21D (b) (2) changed not only the pleading require-
ment for the scienter, or mental state, element of securities fraud but
also the underlying substantive mental state requirement itself.41
Determining the exact stringency of the new scienter pleading
standard is important for several reasons. As Senator John Kerry (D-
Mass.) acknowledged in floor debate, procedure is an area of law in
which "minor word changes can produce major consequences. '42
This concern becomes magnified when such a change involves a
pleading requirement regarding a state of mind, which is subjective by
definition and thus provable only by circumstantial evidence. Because
parties cannot obtain such evidence in the vast majority of cases until
they have conducted discovery proceedings, erecting too high a plead-
ing standard might prevent any complaint from surviving a FRCP Rule
12(b) (6) motion to dismiss.43 Further, because the Reform Act
amended the 1934 Act to include an automatic stay of discovery 44
pending motions to dismiss, the Reform Act prohibits a common
plaintiff strategy--amending the complaint45 to reflect evidence un-
covered in discovery. Hence, an extremely strict scienter pleading
standard, coupled with the Reform Act's discovery stay, can make it
virtually impossible for plaintiffs to sufficiently plead the requisite
41 Part III.B.2(b) infra discusses this line of cases.
42 141 CONG. REc. S9204 (daily ed. June 28, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kerry). An
observation, along similar lines, by Senator Specter, proves to have been particularly
relevant:
The rules which govern court procedure .... are complicated on matters
such as how pleadings are formulated, how specific you have to be, and
what to say to get in court before you are entitled to discovery ....
... It is not the kind of a matter which is customarily brought before
the Banking Committee.
Id. at S8920-21 (daily ed. June 22, 1995) (statement of Sen. Specter).
43 See id. at S8916 (daily ed. June 22, 1995) (statement of Sen. Bryan). Senator Bryan
noted:
Under current law, fraud plaintiffs are not required to state specific facts
establishing the defendant's intent. That is a subjective state of mind ....
It is a pretty onerous burden to be able to allege with particularity what the
subjective thought process would be of a defendant.
The reason for that is because such facts are normally only uncovered
later during a deposition or discovery process when there is a chance to
examine the defendant or defendants under oath.
Id.
44 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (3) (B) (Supp. 111996). Section 78u-4(b) (3) (B) amended
the 1934 Act to include new section 21D(b) (1), which reads:
In any private action arising under this subchapter, all discovery and
other proceedings shall be stayed during the pendency of any motion to
dismiss, unless the court finds, upon the motion of any party, that particu-
larized discovery is necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent undue prej-
udice to that party.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (3) (B).
45 SeeFED. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
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state of mind.46 As a result, the function of securities fraud suits in
promoting full corporate disclosure could be severely impaired. 47
B. The Pre-Reform Act Legal Landscape
1. Substantive Versus Procedural Law
Pleading standards, particularly the pleading standard for the
mental-state requirement of securities fraud actions brought under
Rule lOb-5, tend to be surprisingly technical and complicated. Several
areas of uncertainty in Second Circuit case law, upon which Congress
at the very least modeled section 21D (b) (2)'s strong inference plead-
ing standard, further complicate matters.48 The first area of potential
confusion arises out of the fact that a pleading requirement for the
scienter element of securities fraud lies at the intersection of proce-
dural and substantive law.49 Several courts have failed to recognize
the conceptual distinction between these two aspects of law.50
A pleading requirement is a matter of procedural law and dictates
the allegations, and the stringency of allegations, that a complaint
must contain in order to establish a primafacie case and survive a FRCP
Rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The sci-
enter requirement of securities fraud, however, is a matter of substan-
tive law. It pertains to the mental state that a plaintiff must prove the
defendant acted with at trial in order to win on the merits. Naturally,
both a pleading requirement and an underlying mental-state require-
ment are formulated along continuums: a pleading requirement may
be extremely stringent, somewhat stringent, or not at all stringent;
and a scienter requirement may impose, or excuse, liability for con-
scious knowledge, recklessness, gross negligence, or negligence.
Although the stringency of a pleading requirement for the scienter
element of securities fraud depends, to a certain extent, upon the
stringency of the underlying scienter standard 51 (e.g., if the underly-
ing scienter standard requires reckless behavior, a complaint cannot
46 See 141 CONG. REc. H2849 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1995) (statement of Rep. Dingell).
47 See Brief of Securities Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, Concerning Defend-
ants' Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint at 3, In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (C96-0390 FMS) [hereinafter SEC Amicus Brief].
48 See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.CA.N. 730,
740.
49 On the distinction between substantive and procedural law, see Walter Wheeler
Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE LJ. 333 (1933).
50 See infra Part III.B.2(b).
51 Three cases, namely Friedberg v. Discreet Logic Inc., 959 F. Supp. 42 (D. Mass. 1997),
Norwood Venture Corp. v. Converse Inc., 959 F. Supp. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), and Queen Uno Ltd.
Partnership v. CoeurD'Alene Mines Cop., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (D. Colo. 1998), by misunder-
standing the "one way" relationship between substantive and procedural requirements,
have interpreted section 21D(b) (2) to have raised the pleading requirement for securities
fraud by heightening the underlying substantive scienter requirement. See infra Part
HI.B.2(b) (discussing Friedberg and Norwood Venture).
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plead allegations of mere negligence), a pleading requirement and
the underlying substantive requirement are analytically distinct.
2. The Substantive Element of Scienter
Several of the district court opinions discussed below 52 have inter-
preted section 21D(b) (2) to have heightened both the pleading re-
quirement and, by eliminating liability for reckless behavior, the
substantive scienter requirements for Rule 10b-5 securities fraud.
Thus, one must place the concepts of "scienter" and "recklessness," as
they pertain to securities fraud, in context. The requirement that a
plaintiff bringing an action under Rule lOb-5 must establish that the
defendant acted with a particular state of mind was established in the
touchstone case of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.53 In Ernst & Ernst, the
Supreme Court held that merely negligent conduct does not give rise
to liability for securities fraud.54 The court instead required a showing
of scienter, which it described as "a mental state embracing intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud."55 While the Court acknowledged in
a famous footnote that "certain areas of the law" considered "reckless-
ness" intentional conduct,56 it left unanswered the question of
whether reckless behavior gives rise to liability under section 10(b)
and Rule 1Ob-5. 5 7 The vast majority of circuits subsequently have held
that Rule lOb-5's scienter element does indeed include recklessness. 58
Notwithstanding the nearly uniform acceptance of recklessness as
a form of scienter, the precise definition of recklessness varies greatly
52 See infra Part III.B.2(b).
53 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
54 See id. at 214.
55 Id. at 193 n.12. The Court reached this conclusion through an interpretation of
language in 1934 Act section 10(b), see id. at 195-96, which makes it unlawful for any per-
son to "use or employ ... any manipulative or deceptive device," 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1994),
and language in Rule lOb-5, which states that "[iut shall be unlawful for any person... [t]o
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud," 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998). SeeErnst
& Ernst, 425 U.S. at 195-96.
56 Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12.
57 See id.
58 See, e.g., SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Hollinger v. Titan
Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1569-70 (9th Cir. 1990); Hudson v. Phillips Petroleum Co. (In re
Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig.), 881 F.2d 1236, 1244 (3d Cir. 1989); Van Dyke v. Coburn
Enter. Inc., 873 F.2d 1094, 1100 (8th Cir. 1989); McDonald v. Alan Bush Brokerage Co.,
863 F.2d 809, 814 (11th Cir. 1989); Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1117-18 (10th Cir.
1982); Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 961-62 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc); Mans-
bach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1023-24 (6th Cir. 1979); Cook v. Avien,
Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 692 (1st Cir. 1978); Rolfv. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 46
(2d Cir. 1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044 (7th Cir. 1977);
see also SEC Arnicus Brief, supra note 47, at 5 n.4 (collecting cases); Loss & SELIGmAN, supra
note 3, at 843 n.320 (same). But see Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, What Constitutes Reckless-
ness Sufficient To Show Necessary Element of Scienter in Civil Action for Damages Under § 1 O(b) of
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 49




among the district courts.59 More importantly for this Note's con-
cerns, in interpreting section 21D (b) (2) at least one court, In re Silicon
Graphics, Inc. Securities Litigation,60 has ignored the bulk of Second Cir-
cuit case law and has questioned whether the Second Circuit defini-
tively has held that recklessness constitutes a form of scienter. 6'
Further complicating the issue, the court in Silicon Graphics identified
three distinct lines of cases in the Second Circuit's case law that per-
tain to the scienter element of securities fraud and concluded that in
modeling section 21D(b)(2) upon the Second Circuit's standard,
Congress intended to codify a line of cases holding that scienter does
not include recklessness. 62
3. The Second Circuit's "Strong Inference" Pleading Standard
Pleading requirements also present conceptual difficulties. As
mentioned above, although the complaints in claims brought under
the federal securities laws must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the circuits have applied varying interpretations to the re-
quirements of FRCP Rule 9(b) with respect to pleading the scienter
element of fraud. 63 Because Congress focused on the Second Cir-
cuit's standard as a point of reference in drafting section 21D (b) (2),64
and because the level of stringency that the district courts have af-
forded section 21D(b) (2) has hinged, to a large degree, upon the ex-
tent to which the courts have adopted the two tests developed in
Second Circuit case law, the following discussion is limited to the Sec-
ond Circuit's pleading standard. Under Second Circuit law, in order
to successfully plead the defendant's mental state in a complaint alleg-
ing securities fraud under Rule lOb-5, and thereby survive a defen-
dant's motion to dismiss, the complaint must plead "specific facts"
leading to a strong inference of the requisite scienter. 65 Because di-
rect knowledge of a defendant's state of mind is virtually impossible,
59 See, e.g., Kevin R Johnson, Liability for Reckless Misrepresentations and Omissions Under
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 667, 685-93 (1991)
(identifying four distinct formulations of "recklessness": "'Severe' Recklessness," "'An Ex-
treme Departure from the Standard of Ordinary Care,'" "'Lesser Form of Intent,'" and
"'Barely Reckless'"); William H. Kuehnle, On Scienter, Knowledge, and Recklessness Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 34 Hous. L. Rxv. 121, 122 n.6 (1997) (collecting articles).
60 970 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
61 See id. at 755-57; see also Bruce G. Vanyo et al., The Pleading Standard of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, in SEcURmES LrIGAio N 1997, at 71, 75-78 (PLI
Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-1015, 1997) (identifying the three-way
split in Second Circuit case law).
62 See In re Silicon Graphics, 970 F. Supp. at 754-57. For further consideration of these
three lines of cases, see infra Part III.B.2(b); infra note 311.
63 See supra text accompanying notes 25-29.
64 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
740.
65 In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Beck v.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1987)).
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and because plaintiffs may initiate discovery proceedings only after
they file a complaint, 66 the Second Circuit has developed two tests
that provide alternative means for plaintiffs to plead strong infer-
ence. 67 As stated in In re Time Warner Inc. Securities Litigation, "[t]he
first approach is to allege facts establishing a motive to commit fraud
and an opportunity to do so. The second approach is to allege facts
constituting circumstantial evidence of either reckless or conscious be-
havior."68 However, Second Circuit case law contains a split concern-
ing the precise formulation of these two alternative tests.69 In Beck v.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 7a the court states the tests somewhat
differently by adding the following qualification: " [w] here motive is
not apparent, it is still possible to plead scienter by identifying circum-
stances indicating conscious behavior[ 71] by the defendant, though the
strength of the circumstantial allegations must be correspondingly greater.'72
Thus, the legal landscape upon which Congress enacted, and the
judiciary has sought to interpret, section 21 (D) (b) (2) is much more
complicated, and much less definite, than either branch realized. To
summarize: First, the intersection of procedural and substantive re-
quirements intrinsic to a scienter pleading requirement has been a
source of confusion. Second, though the substantive requirements of
the scienter element of Rule 10b-5 securities fraud are quite settled-
a majority of the circuits include recklessness as a basis for securities
fraud liability-two issues still persist: (1) one court purportedly has
uncovered a split within the Second Circuit's case law, suggesting that
the circuit has yet to resolve conclusively the recklessness question;
and (2) those circuits that definitively hold that reckless conduct con-
stitutes scienter have employed a wide range of definitions for reck-
66 See FED. R. Civ. P. 3.
67 See In re Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 268-69.
68 Id. at 269. "Motive" and "Opportunity" are defined in Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp,
Inc., 25 F.3d 1124 (2d Cir. 1994). "Motive would entail concrete benefits that could be
realized by one or more of the false statements and wrongful nondisclosures alleged. Op-
portunity would entail the means and likely prospect of achieving concrete benefits by the
means alleged." Id at 1130.
69 See Douglas M. Parker, Fraud Under Section 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act N.Y.L.J.,
Apr. 11, 1994, at 1. This split within the Second Circuit's case law was uncovered in con-
gressional floor discussion, in exchanges between Senators Specter and Dodd surrounding
the House Conference Report, see infra text accompanying notes 149-54, and preceding
congressional override of President Clinton's veto, see infra text accompanying notes 158-
64.
70 820 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1987).
71 At this point, the reader need only focus on the procedural differences between In
re Time Warner and Beck. In re Time Warner and Beck formulate the two alternative tests
differently in that Beck includes the following qualification: when a plaintiff does not pur-
sue the first possible test (i.e., the motive and opportunity prong), the circumstantial evi-
dence required in the second test must be "correspondingly greater." Beck, 820 F.2d at 50.
For arguments against interpreting the term "conscious knowledge," as found in Beck, to
exclude liability for recklessness, see infra note 311.
72 Beck, 820 F.2d at 50 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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lessness. Finally, although the Second Circuit's pleading standard
certainly requires the allegation of specific facts leading to a strong
inference of scienter, a second split within the Second Circuit's case
law indicates two distinct formulations of the two alternative tests for
establishing a strong inference.
II
TBE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HEIGHTENED PLEADING
STANDARD FOR SCIENTER IN CONGRESS
This Part attempts to organize the legislative history pertaining to
section 21D(b) (2), from its introduction in the House of Representa-
tives in early January of 1995 to its enactment over presidential veto in
late December of that year. The goal is to better understand the gen-
eral import of the provision and to provide a point of reference for
Part III, which maps judicial interpretation of this legislative history.
This Part traces the development of the scienter pleading standard
provision chronologically within each house of Congress and consid-
ers every version of the scienter pleading standard as it appeared in
the bills of the Senate and the House of Representatives. 73 It further
analyzes the suggested and rejected amendments surrounding the
Senate Committee and House Conference Committee Reports, Presi-
dent Clinton's veto of the Reform Act, and all significant congres-
sional floor discussion that accompanied the congressional override
of the presidential veto. 74
A. The House of Representatives
The first version of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995, introduced in the House of Representatives as Tite II of The
Common Sense Legal Reform Act of 1995-House Bill 1075- pro-
posed to reform abusive litigation practices in the tort liability system
as a whole.76 House Bill 10 contained provisions that altered both the
pleading and the substantive requirements of the scienter element of
securities fraud. It required that a complaint alleging securities fraud
73 One should note at the outset that the House of Representatives and the Senate
approached the issue of heightening the pleading standard for scienter in slightly different
ways. When the Reform Act bill first developed in the House, it included provisions that
altered both procedural aspects (i.e., pleading requirements) and substantive aspects (i.e.,
elements of a cause of action) of securities fraud actions. However, the relevant provisions
in the Senate bill were always tightly circumscribed to the pleading stage of securities
fraud. Thus, while the House spent significant time discussing the exact definition of the
scienter element of securities fraud, whether to include recklessness, and if so, how to
define recklessness, this type of discussion is completely absent from Senate debate.
74 For an excellent, step-by-step summary of the legislative history of the Reform Act,
seeJohn W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding Road to the Private Securi-
tis Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 Bus. LAW. 335 (1996).
75 H.R. 10, 104th Cong. (1995).
76 See Avery, supra note 74, at 347-48.
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plead "specific facts" demonstrating that the defendant had acted with
the required scienter.7 7 By explicitly requiring that a defendant act
knowingly, and thus eliminating liability for recklessness, House Bill
10 also altered the mental state requirement for Rule lOb-5 actions:
In any action under section 10(b), a defendant may be held
liable for money damages only on proof-
(2) that the defendant knew the statement was misleading at
the time it was made, or intentionally omitted to state a fact knowing
that such omission would render misleading the statement made at
the time they were made.78
The House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance
("House Subcommittee") held hearings on Title II of House Bill 10
on January 1979 and February 10,80 1995. During these hearings Se-
curities Exchange Commission ("SEC") Chairman Arthur Levitt testi-
fied as to the SEC's opposition to House Bill 10's elimination of
recklessness as a basis of liability for securities fraud.81 The House
Subcommittee passed Tite II of House Bill 10 on February 14, 1995,82
and on February 16, 1995, the House Committee on Commerce
("Commerce Committee") marked up and reported the bill.8 3 This
version included significant changes to the requirements for securities
fraud, which now included and defined recklessness.8 4
On February 27, 1995, Chairman Blilely introduced a revised ver-
sion of Titie II of House Bill 10, redesignated as House Bill 1058.85
House Bill 1058's requirements for securities fraud generally followed
those of the version reported out of the Commerce Committee. Nota-
bly, it included recklessness as grounds for securities fraud liability.86
It also included a definition of "reckless behavior," modeled on Sunds-
trand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp.,87 and provided an example of reck-
77 See H.R. 10, 104th Cong. § 204 (1995) (proposing addition to section 10 of the
1934 Act).
78 Id. (emphasis added).
79 See Common Sense Legal Reform Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms. and Fin.
of the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong., 1-156 (1995).
80 See id. at 157-338.
81 See i. at 191-221 (statement, prepared statement, and testimony of Arthur Levitt).
82 See 141 CONG. REc. D191 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 1995).
83 See id. at D208 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1995).
84 See Avery, supra note 74, at 349-50.
85 H.R. 1058, 104th Cong. (1995).
86 See id. at § 4 (proposing new section 10A(a) of the 1934 Act). This part of the
provision read: "Requirements for Securities Fraud Actions. (a) Scienter-... In any pri-
vate action arising under this tide based on a fraudulent statement, liability may be estab-
lished only on proof that.., the defendant made such fraudulent statement knowingly or
recklessly." Id. (proposing new section 1OA(a) (1) (C) of the 1934 Act).
87 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977) (quoting Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev.
Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Okla. 1976)). The definition of "recklessness" formulated in
Sundstrand is the most widely followed among the circuits. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note
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less behavior.8 8 However, House Bill 1058 added language to House
Bill 10's pleading requirement, making it more stringent than House
Bill 10. Rather than merely requiring that the complaint make "spe-
cific allegations" regarding the requisite scienter, it required that the
"complaint ... make specific allegations which, if true, would be suffi-
cient to establish scienter as to each defendant at the time the alleged
violation occurred."89 The House debated House Bill 1058 on March
790 and March 8, 91 1995. The debate regarding the substantive re-
quirements for securities fraud did not center on the reinclusion of
recklessness as a substantive ground for liability, but on House Bill
1058's definition of recklessness. 92 An amendment offered by Repre-
sentative Anna Eshoo (D-Cal.), 93 which the House eventually rejected,
would have stricken the second line of House Bill 1058's definition of
recklessness. This line of House Bill 1058 provided by way of example
that "a defendant who genuinely forgot to disclose, or to whom disclo-
sure did not come to mind, is not reckless." 94 Representative Christo-
3, at 843; see also 141 CONG. REC. H2818 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1995) (statement of Rep. Blilely)
(describing the importance of the Sundstrand definition).
88 The provision reads:
[A] defendant makes a fraudulent statement recklessly if the defendant, in
making such statement, is guilty of highly unreasonable conduct that (A)
involves not merely simple or even gross negligence, but an extreme depar-
ture from standards of ordinary care, and (B) presents a danger of mislead-
ing buyers or sellers that was either known to the defendant or so obvious
that the defendant must have been consciously aware of it. For example, a
defendant who genuinely forgot to disclose, or to whom disclosure did not
come to mind, is not reckless.
H.R. 1058 § 4 (proposing new section 10A(a) (4) of the 1934 Act).
89 Id. (emphasis added) (proposing new section 10A(b) of the 1934 Act). The provi-
sion also provided that: "It shall not be sufficient for this purpose to plead the mere pres-
ence of facts inconsistent with a statement or omission alleged to have been misleading."
Id.
90 See 141 CONG. REc. H2760-61 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1995).
91 See id. at H2818 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1995).
92 There in fact seems to have been general approval for what would have been the
first codification of a definition of recklessness. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc. H2761 (daily ed.
Mar. 7, 1995) (statement of Rep. Fields) ("For the first time in the securities laws, a stan-
dard for reckless conduct is defined"). The next day, Representative Ganske added:
[A]s for the definition of recklessness, the current law is vague and uncer-
tain [and] ... has led to a great deal of inconsistency, confusion, and un-
fairness ....
I think all of us would agree that by creating consistency we can in-
crease fairness and decrease the probability of injustice in our legal system.
Id. at H2764 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1995) (statement of Rep. Ganske). Note that the Reform
Act did not ultimately include a definition of "recklessness."
93 See id. at H2818 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1995).
94 H.R. 1058, 104 Cong. § 4 (1995) (proposing new section 1OA(a) (4) of the 1934
Act). Representative Eshoo believed that including this language would allow a defendant
to "escape liability by saying ... . 'I forgot to tell the truth.'" See 141 CONG. REc. H2818
(daily ed. Mar. 8, 1995) (statement of Rep. Eshoo); see also id. at H2753-54 (daily ed. Mar.
7, 1995) (statement of Rep. Dingell) (stating that H.R. 1058 would "encourage securities
fraud" because it "establish[es] a defense against recklessness that allows a miscreant to get
off by the simple statement of, 'Ooops, I forgot the law'"); id at H2820 (daily ed. Mar. 8,
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pher Cox (R-Cal.) also offered an amendment to this sentence of the
recklessness definition. He proposed to replace the sentence in an
attempt to distinguish more precisely between recklessness and gross
negligence on the one hand and between recklessness and intentional
conduct on the other. The House ultimately passed this amendment,
which appears in the final version of House Bill 1058.95
The procedural requirement for pleading the scienter element of
securities fraud was also the subject of contention on the floor of the
House. The Representatives were primarily concerned that the plead-
ing standard's requirement that a complaint "make specific allega-
tions... sufficient to establish [s] cienter"96 was impossibly strict. As
Representative Edward Bryant (R-Tenn.) argued in favor of his pro-
posed amendment, House Bill 1058's pleading requirement for scien-
ter would require a plaintiff to include these specific allegations "prior
to discovery when it is virtually impossible for [the] plaintiff to estab-
lish [such] facts." v97 Representative Bryant's proposed amendment
lessened the scienter pleading requirement to require only that the
plaintiff "allege in its complaint facts suggesting that the defendant ac-
ted with [the required state of mind]. "98 The House ultimately re-
jected this amendment 99 and retained the original language of House
Bill 1058's pleading requirement when the bill passed by a vote of 325
to ninety-nine on March 8, 1995.100
1995) (statement of Rep. Manton) (arguing that H.RL 1058's definition of recklessness
excuses liability for "willful blindness").
Those who opposed the Eshoo amendment argued that the second, example sentence
of House Bill 1058's definition of recklessness came directly from Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun
Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977), and that its inclusion was therefore
necessary to make the definition complete. See, e.g., 141 CONG. Rac. H2818 (daily ed. Mar.
8, 1995) (statement of Rep. Blilely) ("[T] he second sentence of the recklessness definition
comes directly from [a footnote in] the Sundstrand decision.... The Sundstrand court was
using the footnote to explain that the standard for recklessness is something more than
inexcusable negligence.").
95 This amendment read: "Deliberately refraining from taking steps to discover
whether one's statements are false or misleading constitutes recklessness, but if the failure
to investigate was not deliberate, such conduct shall not be considered to be reckless." 141
CONG. REc. H2820 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1995).
96 H.R 1058, 104th Cong. § 4 (1995) (proposing new section 1OA(a) (4) of the 1934
Act).
97 141 CONG. REc. H2848 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1995); see also id. at H2849 (statement of
Rep. Dingell) ("[Tihis legislation, as now drawn, makes it impossible [for a plaintiff to
survive a Rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss] without having both an attorney, a psychiatrist,
and probably a psychic.").
98 Id. at H2848 (emphasis added).
99 See id. at H2852.
100 See id. at H2863-64. Thus, the requirements for securities fraud, as they appeared
in the final version of House Bill 1058 adopted by the House read:
SECTION 10A. REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURITIES FRAUD ACTIONS.
(a) Scienter.-
(1) In General.-In any private action arising under this title based




1. Floor Discussion and the Senate Report
On January 18, 1995, Senators Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.) and
Pete Domenici (R-N.M.) introduced the Senate's version of the Re-
form Act,101 Senate Bill 240.102 The Senate never purported to alter
the substantive requirements for securities fraud. The pleading re-
quirement for scienter in the original version of the bill erected a
standard identical to that required of a complaint when pleading the
"circumstances constituting fraud" under the first sentence of FRCP
Rule 9 (b). Thus, the standard was significantly higher than the "gen-
eral averment" pleading standard set out in the second sentence of
FRCP Rule 9(b).10 3 Though Senator Domenici explained that the
new provision simply required "specificity in pleading securities
fraud,"' 04 several Senators argued that the standard was more strin-
gent than any that the federal courts of appeals currently em-
ployed.10 5 The provision read as follows: "In [securities fraud actions
brought under Rule lOb-5], the plaintiffs complaint shall allege spe-
cific facts demonstrating the state of mind of each defendant at the
time the alleged violation occurred.' 0 6
(c) The defendant made such fraudulent statement knowingly
or recklessly.
(4) Recklessness.-For purposes of paragraph (1), a defendant
makes a fraudulent statement recklessly if the defendant, in making such
statement, is guilty of highly unreasonable conduct that (A) involves not
merely simple or even gross negligence, but an extreme departure from
standards of ordinary care, and (B) presents a danger of misleading buy-
ers or sellers that was either known to the defendant or so obvious that
the defendant must have been consciously aware of it. Deliberately re-
fraining from taking steps to discover whether one's statements are false
or misleading constitute recklessness, but if the failure to investigate was
not deliberate, such conduct shall not be considered reckless.
(b) Requirements for Explicit Pleading of Scienter.- ... [T]he com-
plaint shall... make specific allegations which, if true, would be sufficient
to establish scienter as to each defendant at the time the alleged violation
occurred.
Id.
101 See 141 CONG. REc. S1075 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1995).
102 S. 240, 104th Cong. (1995).
103 For the text of FRCP Rule 9(b), see supra note 25.
104 141 CONG. REc. S1076 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1995).
105 See 141 CoNG. REc. S8916 (daily ed. June 22, 1995) (statement of Sen. Bryan)
("[T]he original S. 240 tried to block cases ... through impossible pleading standards
requiring plaintiffs to state specific acts demonstrating the state of mind of each defen-
dant. Witness after witness indicated that this would prevent, for all practical purposes,
many fraud victims from recovering their money.").
106 S. 240 § 104 (proposing new section 39(a) of the 1934 Act). An analysis document
introduced with Senate Bill 240 supports Senator Domenici's description of the proposed
addition of section 39 (a) to the 1934 Act "Section 39(a) ... requires the plaintiff to allege
in its complaint specific facts demonstrating why the plaintiff believes that each such defen-
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The Senate's Subcommittee on Securities ("Senate Subcommit-
tee") held hearings on March 2, March 22, and April 6, 1995.107 Dur-
ing his April 6 testimony, SEC Chairman Levitt expressed the
Commission's views on both the Senate and House bills. Acknowledg-
ing House Bill 1058's concern with the substantive liability aspect of
scienter and its definition of recklessness, Chairman Levitt advised
Congress to codify the Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp.108 defini-
tion of recklessness. 10 9 With regard to the pleading requirement,
Chairman Levitt urged Congress to adopt the Second Circuit's strong
inference standard.'10 The Senate Bill, as reported out of the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs ("Senate Bank-
ing Committee") on June 19, 1995, codified the Second Circuit's
strong inference pleading standard, but it did not add language per-
taining to the substantive scienter requirement. The relevant provi-
sion read: "In any private action arising under this title . . . the
plaintiff's complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged
to violate this title, specifically allege facts giving rise to a strong infer-
ence that the defendant acted with the required state of mind."'
The Committee Report accompanying the bill contained a paragraph,
which a large number of courts have relied on," 2 explaining how the
Committee arrived at this pleading standard:
The Committee does not adopt a new and untested pleading
standard that would generate additional litigation. Instead, the
Committee chose a uniform standard modeled upon the pleading
standard of the Second Circuit. Regarded as the most stringent
pleading standard, the Second Circuit requires that the plaintiff
plead facts that give rise to a "strong inference" of defendant's
fraudulent intent. The Committee does not intend to codify the Second
Circuit's caselaw interpreting this pleading standard, although courts may
find this body of law instructive."3
dant had such an intent. Blanket assertions of intent unconnected to any facts would be
insufficient." 141 CONG. REc. S1086 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1995).
107 See Senate Hearings, supra note 25.
108 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1977).
109 See Senate Hearings, supra note 25, at 251-53 (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman,
SEC). The House's endorsement of the Sundstrand definition is discussed supra note 87
and accompanying text.
110 See Senate Hearings, supra note 25, at 248 (citing In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9
F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993)).
111 S. 240, 104th Cong. § 104 (proposing new section 39(a) of the 1934 Act); see 141
CONG. REc. S8614 (daily ed. June 19, 1995) (reporting the bill out of committee); id& at
S8888 (daily ed.June 22, 1995) (providing the text of the bill as reported from the commit-
tee); see also id at S8892 (statement of Sen. D'Amato) ("S. 240... codifies the pleading
standard of the second circuit in New York .... ").
112 See infra Part III.B.
113 S. REP. No. 104-98, at 15 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694 (emphasis
added) (footnotes omitted). With regard to the Second Circuit's "strong inference" stan-
dard, the Committee Report expressly cited to In re Time Warner Inc. Securities Litigation, 9
F.3d 259, 268 (2d Cir. 1993). See id& at 15 n.46, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694 n.46.
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The Senate Bill was debated on the floor for five days in June
1995.114 Senators expressed general approval and disapproval regard-
ing the actual text of Senate Bill 240's pleading standard." 5 Most of
the debate, however, centered around an amendment proposed by
Senator Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) that approved of Senate Bill 240's codi-
fication of the Second Circuit's strong inference standard, but sought
further to codify Second Circuit case law interpreting the standard-
in particular the two alternative tests for establishing a strong infer-
ence of scienter."16 Because much of the disagreement among the
district courts has revolved around the binding effect and preceden-
tial value of the tests developed in the Second Circuit, this Note con-
siders in detail the arguments Senator Specter made in support of his
amendment.
2. The Specter Amendment
The Specter amendment attempted to codify the two alternative
tests developed in the Second Circuit.117 The amendment, which ad-
ded language explaining how plaintiffs may establish a strong infer-
ence, read in pertinent part:
114 See 141 CoNG. REc. S8885, S8935, 58962 (daily ed. June 22, 1995); id. at S8966
(daily ed.June 23, 1995); id at S9032, S9089 (daily ed.June 26, 1995); i& at S9109, S9126,
S9133, S9143, S1950 (daily ed. June 27, 1995); id. at 59199, S9318, S9320 (daily ed. June
28, 1995).
115 See, e.g., id. at S8892 (daily ed.June 22, 1995) (statement of Sen. D'Amato) ("S. 240
creates a uniform pleading standard that will help to weed out frivolous complaints before
companies must pay heavy legal bills [because it] ... codifies the pleading standard of the
second circuit in New York.. . ."). Senator Dodd added:
The bill clarifies current requirements that lawyers should have some facts
to back up their assertion of securities fraud by adopting the reasonable
standards established by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
... This is not some arbitrary standard pulled out of a hat or crafted in
committee; it follows the Federal courts.
Id. at S8895 (statement of Sen. Dodd).
116 Senator Specter described his proposed amendment as follows:
What this amendment does is to accept the very stringent standard of the
second circuit on pleading to show state of mind, and then it adds to the
legislation the way the second circuit says you can allege the necessary state
of mind.
The bill, quite properly, tightens up the pleading standards by estab-
lishing the most stringent rule of any circuit.
Id. at S9200 (daily ed. June 28, 1995) (statement by Senator Specter).
117 Although Senator Specter stated explicitly that he based his formulation on the two
alternative tests in Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1987), it
more closely resembled the formulation of the test as it appears in In re Time Warner Inc.
Securities Litigation, 9 F.3d 259, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1993). In re Time Warner is the case upon
which, at SEC Chairman Levitt's suggestion, see supra note 110 and accompanying text, the
Senate Committee based S.240's "strong inference" language. That Beck and In re Time
Warner in fact formulate the Second Circuit's two alternative tests differently is only explic-
itly discussed in two exchanges between Senators Specter and Dodd. See infra text accom-
panying notes 149-54, 158-62.
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For purposes of paragraph (1), a strong inference that the de-
fendant acted with the required state of mind may be established
either-
(A) by alleging facts to show that the defendant had both mo-
tive and opportunity to commit fraud; or
(B) by alleging facts that constitute strong circumstantial evi-
dence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness by the defendant. 118
Senator Specter offered two arguments for the inclusion of these tests.
First, he argued that the codification of the Second Circuit's strong
inference pleading standard without guidance as to how a complaint
might satisfy that standard was unfair to plaintiffs. 1 9 Senator Spec-
ter's second concern, and an issue which is at the center of the cur-
rent debate in the district courts,120 pertained to the seemingly
contradictory intent evidenced in the Senate Report. The Senate Re-
port states that Senate Bill 240's heightened pleading requirement is
modeled on the Second Circuit's strong inference standard and not a
"new and untested pleading standard."'121 However, argued Specter,
by failing to incorporate the two alternative tests into the statute and
choosing instead merely to allow the courts to consult the tests for
guidance, the Senate Report in effect advocates a new and untested
pleading standard. 122 It follows, Specter pointed out, that if the two
alternative tests developed in Second Circuit case law are not codified,
"then this bill allows courts to interpret this tougher pleading stan-
118 141 CONG. REc. S9170 (daily ed.June 27, 1995). After introducing his amendment,
Senator Specter went on to discuss the Second Circuit's standard:
Judge John Newman, who established this standard in the case of Beck [v.]
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., said:
".. A common method for establishing a strong inference of scienter
is to allege facts showing a motive for committing fraud and a clear oppor-
tunity for doing so. Where motive is not apparent, it is still possible to
plead scienter by identifying circumstances indicating conscious behavior
by the defendant, though the strength of the circumstantial allegations
must be correspondingly greater."
Id. at S9171 (daily ed. June 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Specter) (quoting Beck, 820 F.2d at
50). As discussed below, the precise formulation of this test becomes a topic of contention
in floor debate surrounding the Senate Report, the House Conference Report, and Presi-
dent Clinton's veto. See infra Part II.C.
119 Senator Specter stated:
This is just basic fundamental fairness that if you take the second circuit
standard, you ought to take the entire standard .... How do you get into
somebody else's head? [By codifying the second circuit test, you] at least
... let the plaintiff know... they are going to be able to plead ... the way
the second circuit itself permits.
141 CONG. REc. S9200-01 (daily ed. June 28, 1995) (statement of Sen. Specter).
120 See infra Part III.
121 S. RFP. No. 104-98, at 15 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694.
122 See 141 CONG. REc. S9171 (daily ed. June 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Specter)
("[I] t is one thing for the committee to say that they are not adopting a new and untested




dard anyway they choose, and courts may impose some standards
which go far beyond what the second circuit.., had in mind in impos-
ing this tough pleading standard."1 23
Senator Specter's logic did not persuade all of his colleagues, and
Senator Robert Bennett (R-Utah) provided first-hand insight into the
Senate Committee's reasons for not codifying the Second Circuit's
case law. Senator Bennett made it clear that the Committee purposely
decided to leave the Second Circuit tests uncodified:
[T] he committee intentionally did not provide language to give gui-
dance on exactly what evidence would be sufficient to prove facts
giving rise to a strong inference of fraud.
... They felt that with the second circuit standard being written
into the bill, it was best to stop at that point and allow the courts
then the latitude that would come beyond that point.'2 4
Senator Alfonse D'Amato (R-N.Y.), also a member of the Senate Com-
mittee, opposed the Specter amendment because he believed that
codification of the Second Circuit tests would, in effect, "straight-
jacket" the courts and would upset the "balanced" approach the Com-
mittee had intended.125 Despite these objections, the Senate accepted
the Specter amendment, 26 and it appears in the final version of Sen-
ate Bill 240, which the Senate passed on June 28, 1995 by a vote of
seventy to twenty-nine. 127
C. The House Conference Report, Presidential Veto, and
Congressional Override
On November 28, 1995, after several months of negotiations, a
Committee of Conference reconciled the differences between the
123 Id.
124 Id. at S9172 (statement of Sen. Bennett).
125 1& at S9201 (daily ed. June 28, 1995) (statement of Sen. D'Amato) ("This amend-
ment goes too far, however, because it actually tells the court how to interpret S. 240's
pleading standards.").
126 See id. (passing amendment by a vote of 57 to 42).
127 See id. at S9219. Thus, the scienter pleading standard as it appeared in the final
version of the Senate Bill 240 bill adopted by the Senate read:
(b) REQuuIR STATE OF MIND.-
(1) In General.-In any private action arising under this tide... the
complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged to violate this
title, specifically allege facts giving rise to a strong inference that the de-
fendant acted with the required state of mind.
(2) Strong Inference of Fraudulent Intent.-For purposes of para-
graph (1), a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required
state of mind may be established either-
(A) by alleging facts to show that the defendant had both motive
and opportunity to commit fraud; or
(B) by alleging facts that constitute strong circumstantial evi-




House and Senate bills.1 28 The Committee filed the final version of
the Reform Act bill, together with a "Statement of Managers" describ-
ing the Committee's intent, in House Conference Report 104-369.129
The pleading standard for scienter in the final version of the Reform
Act bill adopted the strong inference language of the Senate bill, but
dropped the two alternative tests contained in the Specter amend-
ment.1-0 Further, the Committee omitted from the final version of
the Reform Act bill any provision purporting to alter the substantive
requirements of securities fraud. Thus, the House Conference Report
dropped House Bill 1058's explicit inclusion of recklessness as a basis
of liability and its definition of recklessness. 131 Ultimately enacted as
section 21D(b) (2) of the 1934 Act, the final version of the pleading
requirement reads:
REQUIRED STATE OF MIND.-In any private action arising under this
title in which the plaintiff may recover money damages only on
proof that the defendant acted with a particular state of mind, the
complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged to vio-
late this title, state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong in-
ference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind. 1 2
According to the House Conference Report's Statement of Man-
agers, the conferees adopted the heightened pleading standard to cre-
ate uniformity among the circuits, which had thitherto interpreted
the requirements of FRCP Rule 9 (b) in conflicting ways.188 The State-
ment of Managers explicitly states that the language of the heightened
pleading provision was written "to conform.., to Rule 9(b)'s notion
of pleading with particularity," and also was based, "in part," on the
Second Circuit's pleading standard. 134 The Statement of Managers
then describes, in somewhat cryptic fashion, the conferee's reasoning
for dropping the language that the Specter amendment had added to
the Senate bill:
Regarded as the most stringent pleading standard, the Second Cir-
cuit requirement is that the plaintiff state facts with particularity,
and that these facts, in turn, must give rise to a "strong inference" of
the defendant's fraudulent intent. Because the Conference Committee in-
128 See id. at H13,692, H13,699 (daily ed. Nov. 28, 1995).
129 See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.CA.N. 730,
730.
130 See 141 CONG. REc. H13,695 (daily ed. Nov. 28, 1995).
131 For the text of the final House Bill 1058, with respect to the pleading standard, see
supra note 100.
132 141 CONG. REc. H13,695 (daily ed. Nov. 28, 1995).





tends to strengthen existing pleading requirements, it does not intend to cod-
ify the Second Circuit's case law interpreting this pleading standard.'3 5
Then, in the appended footnote 23, the Statement of Managers
adds: "For this reason, the Conference Report chose not to include in
the pleading standard certain language relating to motive, opportu-
nity, or recklessness."'13 6 According to a statement Senator Dodd
made during floor discussion, the pleading standard in the revised bill
struck a "balance" between the pleading standards found in the Sen-
ate and House bills.137 The Conference Committee appears to have
opted against the House bill's extremely stringent pleading require-
ment, but strengthened the Senate bill's standard by dropping the
Specter amendment's two alternative tests and by replacing Senate
Bill 240's "specifically allege" language with the requirement that a
complaint must state "with particularity" facts giving rise to a strong
inference of the required scienter.'38 The language of the Statement
of Managers suggests that the Committee intended to codify the Sec-
ond Circuit's strong inference standard, but then states that the Com-
mittee's intention was to "strengthen existing pleading
requirements.' 1 39 The Committee sought to accomplish this goal, ac-
cording to the Statement of Managers, by not codifying the Second
Circuit's case law interpreting the strong inference pleading stan-
dard.140 Moreover, the "motive, opportunity, or recklessness" lan-
guage in footnote 23 presumably refers to Second Circuit case law,
particularly the two alternative tests developed in Beck v. Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co.,141 In re Time Warner Inc. Securities Litigation,142 and
the Specter amendment.143 -However, as the courts have recognized,
this explanation raises as many questions as it answers.1-M
Floor discussion continued in each house prior to the passage of
the bill in the Senate on December 5, 1995,145 and in the House of
Representatives on December 6, 1995.146 The Reform Act bill's
heightened pleading requirement received only minimal attention in
135 Id. (emphasis added).
136 Id. at 48 n.23, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A-N. 730, 747 n.23
137 141 CONG. REc. S17,960 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
138 Compare the text of the House Conference Report, see supra text accompanying
note 135, with the final version of Senate Bill 240, see supra note 127. Note that this "with
particularity" language was in neither the Senate nor the House bill.
139 H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41.
140 See id.
141 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1987).
142 9 F.3d 259, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1993).
143 See 141 CONG. REc. S9170 (daily ed.June 27,1995). That Beck and In re Time Warner
in fact formulate the Second Circuit's two alternative tests differently is only explicitly dis-
cussed in two exchanges between Senators Specter and Dodd. See infra text accompanying
notes 149-54, 158-62.
144 See infra Part Ill.
145 See 141 CONG. REc. S17,997 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995).
146 See id. at H14,055 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995).
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the House of Representatives.1 47 By contrast, the heightened plead-
ing standard received considerable attention in the Senate. 148 The
most heated exchange arose between Senators Dodd and Specter. As
one might expect, the Conference Committee's elimination of the
Second Circuit's two alternative tests concerned Senator Specter be-
cause it left plaintiffs without guidance as to what a complaint must
allege in order to plead a strong inference of scienter.149 This
change, along with the Conference Committee's replacement of the
requirement that a complaint "specifically allege facts," as found in
the final version of Senate Bill 240, with the requirement that a com-
plaint state the facts "with particularity," led Specter to assert that the
committee created an "impossible pleading standard."150 In response
to Senator Specter's protests, Senator Dodd, a member of the Confer-
ence Committee, attempted to clarify the committee's intention. In
so doing, Senator Dodd brought to light the confusion over the exact
formulation of the Second Circuit's tests. Senator Dodd stated that
the Conference Committee eliminated the Specter amendment be-
cause the version of the Second Circuit's two alternative tests con-
tained therein was but one of several formulations of the test and
"omit[ted] a critical qualification in the case law."'151 According to
Senator Dodd, the Specter amendment ignored the fact that a
number of Second Circuit cases had "held that 'where motive is not
apparent, a plaintiff may plead scienter by identifying circumstances'
indicating wrongful behavior, but 'the strength of the circumstantial alle-
147 See, e.g., id. at H14,041 (statement of Rep. Dingell) ("The bill's elevated pleading
standard for scienter . . . will require average investors . . . to know and state facts in
pleadings that are only knowable after discovery.").
148 Statements made by different Senators reflect various understandings of the plead-
ing standard contained in the House Conference Report. Compare id. at S17,993 (daily ed.
Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Grams) ("Codification of the pleading standard adopted
by the second circuit court of appeals."), id. at S17,969 (statement of Sen. Domenici)
("[T]he conference report adopts the pleading standard utilized by the second circuit
court of appeals."), id at S17,983 (statement of Sen. Dole) ("[The House Conference Re-
port] adopts the second circuit's pleading standard."), and id. at S17,984 (statement of
Sen. Moseley-Braun) ("In the area of pleading, the House bill adopted a standard that was
significantly higher than the second circuit standard, which was the standard adopted in
the Senate bill. The Senate position prevailed at conference."), with id. at S17,980 (state-
ment of Sen. Heflin) ("[T]he proponents have retained an extremely difficult pleading
requirement[,] ... [t]he report not only adopts [the 'strong inference'] language but
raises the requirement even more."), id. at S17,992 (statement of Sen. Biden) ("Another of
the troubling provisions in this bill, is the one which adopts a higher pleading standard
than was in the Senate bill-higher in fact than the standard adopted by the second cir-
cuit."), and id. at S17,938 (statement of Sen. Sarbanes) ("The draft conference report de-
leted the Specter amendment, leaving investors without the protection of the additional
second circuit holdings.").
149 See id. at S17,959 (statement of Sen. Specter).
150 Id. at S17,960-61. Compare supra note 127 (quoting the final version of Senate Bill
240), with supra text accompanying note 132 (quoting the final version of the comparable
provision in the House Conference Report).
151 141 CONG. REc. S17,960 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
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gations must be correspondingly greater."' 152 Senator Dodd explained that
the Conference Committee intended to codify the Second Circuit's
strong inference standard but, because of the varied interpretations of
that standard in Second Circuit case law,153 also intended to let the
courts decide what a plaintiff's complaint must plead in order to meet
that standard. 54
President Clinton also realized that the Statement of Managers
could be construed as creating a standard stricter than that of the
Second Circuit and expressed his reservations in the message accom-
panying his veto of the Reform Act bill, which he issued on December
19, 1995.155 In his veto message, the President specifically objected to
what he construed to be the House Conference Report's overly strin-
gent pleading requirement. The President stated that
the pleading requirements of the Conference Report with regard to
a defendant's state of mind impose an unacceptable procedural
hurdle to meritorious claims being heard in Federal courts. I am
prepared to support the high pleading standard of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit-the highest pleading standard
of any Federal circuit court. But the conferees make crystal clear in
the Statement of Managers their intent to raise the standard even
beyond that level. I am not prepared to accept that.
The conferees deleted an amendment offered by Senator Spec-
ter and adopted by the Senate that specifically incorporated Second
Circuit case law with respect to pleading a claim of fraud. Then
they specifically indicated that they were not adopting Second Cir-
152 See id. (emphasis added). Senator Dodd cited to two cases for this qualification. See
Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1987); Three Crown
Ltd. Partnership v. Caxton Corp., 817 F. Supp. 1033, 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1993);.
153 Senator Specter challenged the assertion that the Specter amendment's formula-
tion of the Second Circuit's test, itself drawn from Beck, 820 F.2d at 50, failed to take into
account the qualification to which Senator Dodd drew attention. See 141 CONG. REc.
S17,960 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Specter). Senator Specter argued that
because his amendment required that the plaintiff's complaint establish the required sci-
enter by alleging either "motive and opportunity," or "strong circumstantial evidence" of
the required scienter, the amendment "tracked the second circuit's language directly." Id.
(emphasis added).
154 See id. at 817,960 (statement of Sen. Dodd). In attempting to explain whether the
Conference Committee intended the courts to look solely to Second Circuit case law, Sena-
tor Dodd become somewhat convoluted:
[W]hat we are attempting to do here, again, I think, is instead of trying to
take each case that came under the second circuit, we are trying to get to
the point where we would have well-pleaded complaints. We are using the
standards in the second circuit in that regard, then letting the courts-as
these matters will-test. They can then refer to specific cases, the second
circuit, otherwise, to determine if these standards are based on facts and
circumstances in a particular case.
Id.
155 See Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval the Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, PUB. PAPERS 1912-13 (Dec. 19, 1995) (Wil-
liam J. Clinton) [hereinafter Veto Message].
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cuit case law but instead intended to "strengthen" the existing
pleading requirements of the Second Circuit. All this shows that
the conferees meant to erect a higher barrier to bringing suit than
any now existing-one so high that even the most aggrieved inves-
tors with the most painful losses may get tossed out of court before
they have a chance to prove their case. 156
Debate in the Senate and House of Representatives preceding
congressional override of President Clinton's veto was marked by vary-
ing responses to the President's veto message. On December 20,
1995, the House of Representatives overrode the President's veto (319
to 100)157 with minimal discussion of the heightened pleading stan-
dard. 15 8 The Senate, however, addressed President Clinton's con-
cerns more thoroughly. The Senators divided into two camps on the
heightened pleading requirement. 15 9 The first camp, spearheaded by
Senators Specter and Paul Sarbanes (D-Md.), agreed with President
Clinton that the pleading standard, by dropping the Specter amend-
ment and by adding the "state with particularity" language, erected a
standard more stringent than that of the Second Circuit.160 The sec-
ond camp, led by Senator Dodd, took the position that the President
had incorrectly interpreted the Statement of Managers, and that the
House Conference Report, while not codifying the Second Circuit's
case law, did not create a more stringent pleading standard.' 6 1 Sena-
tor Dodd reiterated that the Committee rejected the Specter amend-
ment because it articulated the Second Circuit's two alternative tests
156 Id. at 1912. President Clinton further stated that he would sign the bill if Congress
"adopt[ed] the Second Circuit pleading standards and reinsert[ed] the Specter amend-
ment." Id.
157 See 141 CONG. REc. H15,223-24 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995).
158 See, e.g., id. at H15,222 (statement of Rep. Berman) ("No one seems to want to
address the specific points of the veto, I suggest, because there [are] no good answers to
those specific points.... We want a pleading standard that matches the Second Circuit.");
id. at H15,216 (statement of Rep. Markey) ("[T]he codification of the second circuit's
standard is something ... that we should be debating out here on the floor."); id. at
H15,219 (statement of Rep. Lofgren) ("The President says he supports the second circuit
standard for pleading. So do I. That is what is included in this bill."); id. at H15,218
(statement of Rep. Moran); id. at H15,220 (statement of Rep. Deutsch).
159 The comments of several Senators appear to miss the central issues altogether. See,
e.g., id. at S19,054-55 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch); id. at S19,149
(daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995) (statement of Sen. Bradley).
160 See id. at S19,046 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Specter); id. at
S19,070-71 (statement of Sen. Sarbanes). Interestingly, Senator Sarbanes quotes the letters
of the following eminent scholars in support of his position: Professor Arthur Miller of
Harvard Law School (stating that the pleading standard " 'effectively will destroy the private
enforcement capacities that have been given to investors to police our Nation's market-
place'"), DeanJohn Sexton of NewYork University School of Law (stating that "'[i] t simply
will be impossible for the plaintiff, without discovery, to meet the standard inserted by the
conference committee at the last minute'"), and Dean Joel Seligman of the University of
Arizona School of Law (stating that the pleading standard would "'prevent a significant
number of meritorious lawsuits from going forward"'). Id. at S19,038 (statement of Sen.
Sarbanes).
161 See id& at S19,067-68 (statement of Sen. Dodd).
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inaccurately. 62 Senator Dodd also denied that the phrases "specifi-
cally allege" and "state with particularity" created different pleading
standards.1 63 Notwithstanding the President's and the Specter/
Sarbanes camp's objections to the heightened pleading standard for
scienter, the Senate overrode the veto on December 22, 1995 (sixty-
eight to thirty).164
III
CONFUSION AMONG THE DisTICr COURTS
This Part identifies the three standards that the district courts
have interpreted section 21D(b) (2) to have created and the main in-
terpretive arguments that each court has employed. 165 Because the
courts reach different outcomes depending on subtle differences in
their interpretive strategy-interpretations which depend, in turn,
upon emphasizing or de-emphasizing different pieces of the legisla-
tive record-this Part begins by examining the related issues that the
courts have attempted to resolve before proceeding to a discussion
and analysis of the three lines of cases.
A. Framing the Issues
The easiest way to frame the central issues of concern in the dis-
trict courts is to identify the questions that the House Conference Re-
162 See id. at S19,068 (statement of Sen. Dodd). Senator Dodd stated that the House
Conference Committee opted not to include the correct formulation of the Second Cir-
cuit's two alternative tests (i.e., the Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 50
(2d Cir. 1987), formulation), with its qualification that it is necessary for a plaintiff to plead
a stronger showing of circumstantial evidence when defendant's motive can not be shown,
because "by codifying guidance you get into an area where you can get some differences of
opinion[;] ... the decision was to take [the language of the Specter amendment] out on
the assumption that courts will look to the guidance." Id. Senator Dodd further stated that
"[we] have left out the guidance... [but] [t]hat does not mean you disregard it." Id.
Senator Dodd relied heavily on a memorandum written by Joseph A. Grundfest, pro-
fessor at Stanford Law School and former Commissioner of the SEC, that understood the
language of the House Conference Report to be "faithful to the Second Circuit's test," and
that "concur[red] with the decision to eliminate the Specter amendment language, which
was an incomplete and inaccurate codification of case law in that circuit." Id. (memoran-
dum from Professor Grundfest inserted in the Congressional Record at the request of Senator
Dodd).
163 See id. at S19,067 (statement of Sen. Dodd). Senator Dodd also stated that the tech-
nical change inserting the "with particularity" language was at the request of the Judicial
Conference of the United States Federal Judiciary, for the sole reason that "'particularity'"
already [had] a meaning under law and 'specifically allege' [did] not. Id. at S19,067.
164 See id. at S19,180 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995).
165 Although the courts that have thus far interpreted section 21D(b) (2) seem to have
settled upon three distinct standards, several courts have arrived at identical standards
through dissimilar interpretive arguments and use of the legislative history, and several
have arrived at different standards despite a similar analysis of the legislative history. Thus,
while the central interpretive strategies behind a given standard will be discussed in detail,




port raised. Most questions stem from the Statement of Manager's
explanation for dropping the Specter amendment.166 How should a
court interpret the conferees' reasoning? Did the conferees intend to
create a more stringent pleading standard than that of the Second
Circuit by adopting the strong inference language from the Second
Circuit case law while overruling the motive and opportunity test for
meeting that standard? Or did the conferees intend to adopt the
strong inference language while leaving to the court's discretion the
decision of what a complaint must allege to meet that standard?
Footnote 23, which accompanied the Statement of Manager's
cryptic message, poses additional questions.167 How should the courts
interpret this footnote? Does it refer solely to the two alternative tests
offered in the Specter amendment, 168 which the Committee deleted
from the final version of section 21D(b) (2),169 or does the reference
to recklessness allude to the House's early proposals170 to codify a def-
inition of the recklessness standard? If footnote 23 does refer solely to
the Specter amendment, does it refer inadvertently to only one key
word-reckless-from the second test that the Second Circuit uses,
even though it specifically refers to the two key words from the first
test?171 Or, was the Committee attempting to "strengthen existing
pleading requirements" by eliminating recklessness as a substantive
basis for securities fraud liability?172
B. The Standards
The thirty-one district courts that have ruled on the meaning of
section 21D (b) (2) fall into three groups, each creating a distinct stan-
dard. The first line of cases has concluded that satisfaction of either of
the Second Circuit's two alternative tests per se suffices to establish
the required strong inference. This line of cases thus has concluded
that Congress intended section 21D (b) (2) to create a standard of ap-
proximately the same stringency as the Second Circuit's strong infer-
ence standard as interpreted by the two alternative tests developed in
that circuit's case law. The second and third lines of cases have con-
166 See H.R. CoNy. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
740. The crucial language of this report is quoted supra text accompanying note 135.
167 See H.R. CoN'a. REP. No. 104-369, at 48 n.23, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 747
n.23; supra text accompanying note 136 (quoting footnote 23).
168 See supra note 127 (quoting final version of Senate Bill 240, as amended by the
Specter amendment).
169 See supra text accompanying note 132 (quoting final version of Reform Act bill, as
amended by the Committee on Conference).
170 See supra note 87 and accompanying text (quoting House Bill 1058's early formula-
tion of the pleading requirements).
171 See supra Part I.B.3 for a discussion of the Second Circuit's two alternative tests.
172 One should note that the district courts discussed below gave no consideration to
section 21D (b) (2)'s requirement that a complaint state facts "with particularity," or that
this language creates an impossible pleading standard.
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cluded that section 21D (b) (2) established a more stringent standard
than the Second Circuit's strong inference standard, as interpreted
under that circuit's case law. The second line of cases has concluded
that the motive and opportunity test no longer suffices to presump-
tively raise a strong inference of scienter. The third line of cases has
rejected the motive and opportunity test outright and has boldly inter-
preted section 21D (b) (2) to eliminate recklessness as a substantive ba-
sis for securities fraud liability. This Part discusses these standards in
order of stringency, from least to most stringent.1 73
1. Standard #1: A Rough Codification of the Second
Circuit Standard
To date, sixteen district courts have found that section 21D (b) (2)
codifies the Second Circuit's pleading standard for pleading scienter
and that Congress intended this standard to be equally as stringent as
the Second Circuit's standard.174 These courts have adopted both
173 It is important to note that, in discussing the Second Circuit's two alternative tests,
the courts in the first two lines of cases, see infra Part III.B.1-2(a), focus primarily on the
first, "motive and opportunity" test. Apparently, these courts understood the second test,
the pleading of facts "constituting circumstantial evidence of either reckless or conscious
behavior," to be the default test for pleading a strong inference, the elimination of which
would literally prevent all complaints from pleading facts sufficient to establish a "strong
inference."
Several cases discuss the debate among the district courts over the meaning of section
21D(b) (2), but find it unnecessary to resolve the issue. See, e.g., Warman v. Overland Data
Inc., No. 97CV833JM (POR), 1998 WL 110018, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 1998); In reStrato-
sphere Corp. Sec. Litig., No. CIV-S-96-708-PMP, 1997 WL 581032, at *8 (D. Nev. May 27,
1997).
174 See Castillo v. Dean Witter Discover & Co., No. 97CV 272, 1998 WL 342050, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1998); Walish v. Leverage Group, Inc., No. Civ. 97-CV-5908, 1998 WL
314644, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 15, 1998); Zuckerman v. Foxmeyer Health Corp., 4 F. Supp.
2d 618, 622-23 (N.D. Tex. 1998); Allison v. Brooktree Corp., 999 F. Supp. 1342, 1351-52
(S.D. Cal. 1998); Zeid v. Kimberley, 973 F. Supp. 910, 915-16 (N.D. Cal. 1997); In re Health
Management Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 192, 200 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Pilarczyk v. Morrison
Knudsen Corp., 965 F. Supp. 311, 320 (N.D.N.Y. 1997), ajf'd by 1998 WL 640447 (2d Cir.
Apr. 6, 1998); Fugman v. Aprogenex, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 1190, 1195 (N.D. Il. 1997); Rehm
v. Eagle Fin. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246, 1253 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Gilford Partners, L.P. v. Sen-
sormatic Elec. Corp., No. 96C4072, 1997 WL 570771, at *18 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 1997);
Galaxy Inv. Fund, Ltd. v. Fenchurch Cap. Management, Ltd., No. 96C8098, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13207, at *37 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 1997); Page v. Derrickson, No. 96-842CIV-T-17C,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3673, at *27 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 24, 1997); Sloane Overseas Fund, Ltd. v.
Sapiens Int'l Corp., 941 F. Supp. 1369, 1377 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Marksman Partners, L.P. v.
Chantal Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1309-12 (C.D. Cal. 1996); STI Classic Fund v.
Boliinger Indus., Inc., No. 3-96-GV-823-R, 1996 WL 885802, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 25,
1996); Fischler v. AmSouth Bancorp., No 96-1567-CIV-T-17A, 1996 WL 686565, at *2 (M.D.
Fla. Nov. 14, 1996); see also Epstein v. Itron, Inc., 993 F. Supp. 1314, 1323-24 (E.D. Wash.
1998) (finding it unnecessary to resolve the issue of the precise stringency of section
21D(b) (2)'s pleading requirement); Weikel v. Tower Semiconductor Ltd., No. 96-371,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22229, at *2 (D.NJ. Oct. 3, 1997) (ruling in dicta that satisfaction of
either of the Second Circuit's two alternative tests suffices to establish a "strong infer-
ence"); In reWellcare Management Group Sec. Litig., Inc., 964 F. Supp. 632, 637 (N.D.N.Y.
1997) (applying the Second Circuit test with no discussion of section 21D (b) (2) or the
Reform Act); Shahzad v. H.J. Meyers & Co., No. 95CIV6196, 1997 WL 47817, at *6-7
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tests developed in the Second Circuit's case law, meaning that a com-
plaint may establish the requisite strong inference by pleading either
motive and opportunity or by alleging facts constituting "circumstan-
tial evidence of either reckless or conscious behavior."175 Of these
sixteen courts, nine courts did not find the language of section
21D (b) (2) ambiguous and looked to Second Circuit case law as the
natural starting point for interpreting the words "strong inference."17 6
These courts applied the Second Circuit's two alternative tests without
so much as discussing the Reform Act's legislative history.
The remaining seven courts concluding that the Second Circuit's
tests survived the enactment of section 21D(b) (2) all discussed, to at
least some extent, the legislative history of the Reform Act. For exam-
ple, in Zeid v. Kimberley, the court recognized the inconsistencies be-
tween the language of section 21D(b) (2) and the legislative record
and engaged in an in-depth consideration of the Reform Act's legisla-
tive history.' 77 The Zeid court considered several pieces of the legisla-
tive history,178 but found congressional intent "equivocal" and
concluded that the statutory language should control. 7 9 Focusing on
the text of section 21D (b) (2), the court reasoned that Congress's
adoption of the strong inference language from the Second Circuit,
and its failure to codify an alternative interpretation to the Second
Circuit's tests, demonstrated "some approval" of that Circuit's case law
and "militate [d] against completely dispensing" with the two alterna-
tive tests.' 80 The court also reasoned that Congress's failure to explic-
itly incorporate the two tests into section 21D(b)(2) meant that
Congress intended the reviewing courts to have "significant leeway"
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 1997) (misapplying Reform Act because complaint was filed prior to De-
cember 21, 1995).
175 In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 269 (2d Cir. 1993).
176 See Castillo, 1998 WL 342050, at *10; Walish, 1998 WL 314644, at *3; Zuckerman, 4 F.
Supp. 2d at 623; Allison, 999 F. Supp. at 1351-52; Pilarczyk, 965 F. Supp. at 320 (citing In re
Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 268-69); Page, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36731, at *27 (following Fischler
and remarking how "Itihis court, in Fischler v. AmSouth Bancorporation, analogized the
'strong inference' standard to that applied by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
... [which] has established two methods for plaintiffs to meet the 'strong inference'");
Galaxy, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13207, at *37; Sloane Overseas Fund, Ltd., 941 F. Supp. at 1377;
Fischler, 1996 WL 686565, at *2.
177 See Zeid, 973 F. Supp. at 915-18. The court stated that "[e]ven though the Reform
Act makes use of the 'strong inference' language, the statute's legislative history creates
some uncertainty as to whether Congress intended to adopt all, some or none of the Sec-
ond Circuit case law interpreting the standard." Id. at 916.
178 See id. at 915-17. The Zeid court considered several pieces of legislative history,
including the Senate Report, the Specter Amendment, the House Conference Report,
President Clinton's veto message, and statements made by Senator Dodd preceding con-
gressional override of the President's veto. See id. at 916. For a discussion of this legislative
history, see supra Part II.
179 See Zeid, 973 F. Supp. at 917 ("Congress did not provide any clear answers for inter-




when interpreting the standard. The court explained that "courts can
and should modify, or in some instances, reject, any case law that is
inconsistent with the letter or spirit of the Reform Act."'181 Applying
this interpretive strategy, the court found that the Second Circuit's
two alternative tests accorded with the language of section
21D (b) (2).182
The remaining six courts 8 3 employed reasoning similar to that of
the Zeid court. These courts reached the same conclusion: while Sec-
ond Circuit case law does not bind the courts,184 the stringency of the
Reform Act's pleading standard is equivalent to the Second Circuit's
interpretation, and the two alternative tests therefore satisfy section
21D (b) (2). In fact, three courts-In re Health Management, Inc. Securi-
ties Litigation,185 Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharmaceutical
181 Id. Interestingly, the Zeid court did find inconsistencies between the Reform Act's
pleading standard and the "strong inference" standard as it was applied in the Second
Circuit, though unrelated to the two alternative tests. The court found that section
21D (b) (2)'s requirement that a complaint "state with particularity" facts giving rise to a
strong inference of scienter is inconsistent with the Second Circuit's application of the
"strong inference" standard, in which that circuit both "ha[d] stated that scienter need not
be pled with 'great specificity'" and held that plaintiffs need only provide a "'mini m al
factual basis for their conclusory allegations of scienter.'" Id. (quoting Connecticut Nat'l
Bank v. Fluor Corp., 808 F. 2d 957 (2d Cir. 1987)).
182 See id. at 917.
183 See In re Health Management, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 192, 201 (E.D.N.Y.
1997); Fugman v. Aprogenex, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 1190, 1195 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (following
Rehm); Rehm v. Eagle Fin. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246, 1253-55 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Gilford Part-
ners, L.P. v. Sensormatic Elec. Corp., No. 96C4072, 1997 WL 570771 at *18 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
10, 1997) (following Rehm); Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharm. Corp., 927 F.
Supp. 1297, 1308-15 (C.D. Cal. 1996); STI Classic Fund v. Bollinger Indus., Inc., No. 3-96-
CV-823-R, 1996 WL 885802, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 1996) (following Marksman Partners);
see also Weikel v. Tower Semiconductor Ltd., No. 96-3711, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22229, at
*2 (D.N.J. Oct. 3, 1997) (following In re Health Management in dicta).
184 Though these courts did interpret the stringency of section 21D(b) (2) to be ap-
proximately identical to the Second Circuit standard, as developed in that circuit's case
law, none of these courts found thatjudges are bound by the Second Circuit's case law. It
is important to clarify that these courts are dealing in terms of case law as a whole, that is,
whether the Second Circuit's two alternative tests are consistent with the language of the
Reform Act. The courts in the first line of cases answer this question in the affirmative. See,
e.g., In re Health Managemen 970 F. Supp. at 201 ("A plaintiff can satisfy this burden by
pleading motive and opportunity, conscious misbehavior, recklessness or by impressing
upon the court a novel legal theory."); Rehm, 954 F. Supp. at 1252 ("We find that [section
21D(b) (2)] adopts the Second Circuit standard but declines to bind courts to the Second
Circuit's interpretation of its standard.").
The first line of cases does not hold, as does the second line of cases (in which the
courts found that section 21 (D) (b) (2) eliminated the presumption that pleading "motive
and opportunity" gives rise to a "strong inference," see infra Part III.B.2(a)), that the ques-
tion of whether the satisfaction of one or both tests developed by the Second Circuit suf-
fices to establish a "strong inference" should be answered on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., In
re Health Management, 970 F. Supp. at 201 (stating that courts must consider whether allega-
tions contained in a complaint satisfy the "strong inference" standard on a case by case
basis, but in fact holding that satisfying either of the Second Circuit's two alternative tests,
will in every case, suffice).
185 970 F. Supp. 192 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
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Corp., 8 6 and Rehm v. Eagle Finance Corp.' 87-went further than Zeid
and specifically concluded that section 21D(b) (2) did not overturn
Second Circuit case law interpreting the strong inference standard. 88
The Rehm and Marksman opinions, in particular, demonstrate the
various routes by which this conclusion can be reached. To begin
with, both the Rehm and Marksman courts found that Congress's verba-
tim incorporation of the Second Circuit's strong inference language
into section 21D (b) (2) provided particularly persuasive evidence that
Congress intended to enact "a pleading standard of approximately the
same specificity." 8 9 In reaching this conclusion, the Marksman court
further argued that there was no basis to conclude that Congress over-
turned the Second Circuit's motive and opportunity test because Con-
gress was silent on the matter.190 Both courts bolster their reasoning
by considering the larger policy goals of the federal securities laws,
which lead them to conclude that Congress did not intend to create a
scienter pleading standard more stringent than that found in the Sec-
ond Circuit. The Rehm court noted that:
Ratchetting up the standard to conform with the stringent Second
Circuit test satisfies Congress' goal of curtailing abusive securities
litigation while still leaving room for aggrieved parties to bring valid
securities fraud claims. To impose a higher pleading standard
would make it extremely difficult to sufficiently plead a 10b-5
claim-an outcome which would certainly be contrary to the broad
remedial purposes of the federal securities laws. 191
186 927 F. Supp. 1297 (C.D. Cal. 1996). In finding that section 21D(b) (2) was of the
same stringency as the "strong inference" pleading standard as interpreted by Second Cir-
cuit case law, the Marksman court dealt thoroughly with the argument that Congress in-
tended to eliminate recklessness as a substantive basis for liability for securities fraud. See id.
at 1309-10. The court's argument against such an interpretation is discussed with the cases
holding that section 21D(b) (2) indeed eliminated liability for recklessness. See infra note
272 and accompanying text.
187 954 F. Supp. 1246 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
188 See In re Health Management, 970 F. Supp. at 200-01; Rehm, 954 F. Supp. at 1252;
Marksman, 927 F. Supp. at 1311.
189 Rehm, 954 F. Supp. at 1252; accord Marksman, 927 F. Supp. at 1310 ("It is worthy of
note that the language used by the [Reform Act] to articulate its scienter pleading stan-
dard... mirrors language traditionally employed by the Second Circuit.... ").
190 See Marksman, 927 F. Supp. at 1311-12 ("[T]here is no basis to conclude that Con-
gress eradicated, sub silentio, the well-established 'motive and opportunity' test .... ."). In
INS v. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 442-43 (1987), the Supreme Court propounded a
similar principle, albeit for the opposite conclusion regarding congressional intent: "'Few
principles of statutory construction are more compelling than the proposition that Con-
gress does not intend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded in
favor of other language.'" Id, (quoting Nachman Corp. v. PBGC, 446 U.S. 359, 392-93
(1980)).
191 Rehm, 954 F. Supp. at 1252 (citation omitted). The Marksman court advanced a
similar, though not as overtly policy oriented, argument: "[T]he conference committee
emphasized that the Second Circuit's pleading standards were the most stringent of any
circuit's, and thus it is reasonable to assume that Second Circuitjurisprudence comes clos-




In a similar vein, the Marksman court assessed the stringency of the
Second Circuit test and concluded that it clearly achieved Congress's
"purpose of making scienter allegations more difficult to plead."' 92
The court found that the test imposed an "exacting analysis" and that
its "analytical framework" was consistent with a more stringent plead-
ing requirement. 193
Lastly, both the Marksman and Rehm courts engaged in a thor-
ough consideration of the Reform Act's legislative history.194 Both
courts limited their discussion primarily to the Senate Report' 95 and
the House Conference Report.196 Interestingly, both courts ultimately
found the House Conference Report to be consistent with the Senate
Report. Although the courts focused on the language in the House
Conference Report which stated that section 21D(b) (2) is "based in
part on the pleading standard of the Second Circuit,' 97 neither court
accorded any weight to the sentence stating that the committee "in-
tends to strengthen existing pleading requirements"' 98 or to the ex-
planatory language in footnote 23.199 Consequently, the courts had
little difficulty reconciling the House and Senate Reports as the au-
thoritative expression of legislative intent. Both courts relied upon
language in the Senate Report which they believed indicates that the
Senate Committee did not "adopt a new and untested pleading stan-
dard," but rather a "uniform standard modeled upon the pleading
standard of the Second Circuit," and which they thought explains that
courts may find that Circuit's case law "instructive."200
192 Marksman, 927 F. Supp. at 1311.
193 Id.
194 See also Epstein v. Itron, Inc., 993 F. Supp. 1314, 1323-24 (E.D. Wash. 1998) (consid-
ering the legislative history behind section 21D (b) (2) in detail, but finding it unnecessary
to resolve the issue of whether Congress intended to adopt the Second Circuit's two test
approach).
195 See supra text accompanying note 113 (quoting the relevant language of the Senate
Report). The Rehm court addressed President Clinton's veto message only in passing. See
Reim, 954 F. Supp. at 1252 n.3.
196 See supra Part II.C.
197 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.Cj.N. 730, 740.
198 Id.
199 See Rehm, 954 F. Supp. at 1251-53; Marksman, 927 F. Supp. at 1310-11. The Rehm
court did not specifically address this language at all. The Marksman court did address this
language but was "unimpressed" with the argument that the "oblique reference to 'motive,
opportunity and recklessness'" in the footnote abrogated the Second Circuit's two altema-
tive tests. Marksman, 927 F. Supp. at 1311. In reaching this conclusion, the Marksman
court downplayed the importance of the footnote and reasoned that "when Congress
wishes to supplant ajudicially-created rule it knows how to do so explicitly, and in the body
of the statute." Id.
200 Marksman, 927 F. Supp. at 1311; Rehm, 954 F. Supp. at 1251-52; see supra text accom-
panying note 113 (quoting the relevant portion of the Committee Report).
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2. Standards #2 and #3: More Stringent Than the Second
Circuit Standard
The two lines of cases surveyed in this section have found that
although Congress modeled the strong inference language of
21D (b) (2) on the Second Circuit's pleading standard, Congress actu-
ally intended the pleading standard to be higher than the Second Cir-
cuit case law's interpretation of that standard.
a. Standard #2: No Presumption That Pleading Motive and
Opportunity Gives Rise to a Strong Inference of Scienter
One line of cases has held that Congress intended section
21D(b) (2) to be more stringent than the Second Circuit's pleading
standard, but did not intend to alter the substantive scienter require-
ments for securities fraud. More precisely, the eight courts20 1 that fall
into this category have held that allegations of motive and opportunity
are relevant, but do not presumptively satisfy section 21D(b)(2)'s
strong inference requirement.
As with the courts adopting standard one, the courts that arrived
at standard two employed various interpretive strategies. The court in
OnBank & Trust Co. v. 1DIC20 2 used reasoning similar to those courts
that concluded that the Second Circuit's two alternative tests per se
satisfy section 21D (b) (2).203 The OnBank court found that the House
Conference Report's treatment of the Second Circuit's case law and
its comment in footnote 23204 were "ambiguous," and the court re-
mained unconvinced that Congress's failure to explicitly codify the
case law meant that it intended to overrule the two tests developed
201 See Miller v. Material Sciences Corp., 9 F. Supp. 2d 925, 926 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Queen
Uno Ltd. Partnership v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1359 (D. Colo.
1998); Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin &Jenrette Sec. Corp., 999 F. Supp. 725, 728 (S.D.N.Y.
1998); In re Glenayre Tech., Inc. Sec. Litig., 982 F. Supp. 294, 297-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1997);
Havenick v. Network Express, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 480, 527-28 (E.D. Mich. 1997); Press v.
Quick & Reilly, No. 96CIV4278, 1997 WL 458666, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1997); In re
Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); OnBank & Trust Co. v. FDIC, 967
F. Supp. 81, 89 (W.D.N.Y. 1997). An outlier is Novak v. Kasaks, 997 F. Supp. 425, 430
(S.D.N.Y. 1998). The Novak court followed Judge Baer's conclusion in Norwood Venture
Corp. v. Converse Inc., 959 F. Supp. 205, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), see discussion infra Part
III.B.2(b), that "evidence of motive and opportunity no longer suffices to plead scienter."
Novak, 997 F. Supp. at 430. However, the Novak court followed Glenayre in concluding that
section 21D (b) (2) did not abrogate liability for recklessness. See Novak 997 F. Supp. at
430. Interestingly, both the court in Novak, 997 F. Supp. at 430, and the court in Glenayre,
982 F. Supp. at 298, emphasized that the classic definition of recklessness, as it pertains to
securities fraud, includes a conscious component. Judge Baer stated in Glenayre that,
"It]he required scienter... has long been held ... to include conscious recklessness. I
emphasize, however, that recklessness in this context approximates actual intent, and is
not merely a heightened form of negligence." Glenayr, 982 F. Supp. at 298 (citations
omitted).
202 967 F. Supp. 81 (W.D.N.Y. 1997).
203 See id. at 88-89.
204 See supra text accompanying notes 135-36.
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therein.20 5 The OnBank court concentrated on the strong inference
language in the text of section 21D(b) (2) and in the Senate Report's
language that courts may find the Second Circuit's case law "instruc-
tive. '206 The court stated that while "allegations of motive, opportu-
nity, or reckless behavior may still be relevant," a deciding court must
consider whether such allegations establish a strong inference of sci-
enter on a case-by-case basis.207
The court in Havenick v. Network Express, Inc. 208 found that the
language in both the House Conference Report, stating that the "Con-
ference Committee intends to strengthen existing pleading require-
ments,"20 9 and in footnote 23 "directly refuted" the plaintiff's
argument that allegations of motive and opportunity presumptively
establish a strong inference of scienter.210 The Havenick court bol-
stered its reliance on the House Conference Report by citing Supreme
Court cases which held that congressional committee reports are "the
most reliable and authoritative source for Congressional intent."211 In
arriving at its conclusion the court also accorded considerable weight
to President Clinton's veto message,212 in which the President inter-
preted the House Conference Report to have "'raise [d] the standard
even beyond"' the Second Circuit's standard.213
Although the court in Queen Uno Ltd. v. Coeur D'Alene Mines
Corp. 214 found the key passages in the House Conference Report and
the Senate Report contradictory and "ambivalent" on the whole, it
concluded that "Congress's unequivocal intention, as noted in both
reports, to 'raise existing pleading requirements' precludes a per se
rule that allegations of motive and opportunity necessarily raise a
205 Onbank 967 F. Supp. at 88 n.4.
206 See id.
207 See id- at 88.
208 981 F. Supp. 480 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
209 H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.CA-N. 730, 740.
210 Havenick, 981 F. Supp. at 527.
211 Id. (citing Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984)); see also Garcia, 469 U.S.
at 76 ("The authoritative source for finding the Legislature's intent lies in the Committee
Reports on the bill, which 'represen[t] the considered and collective understanding of
those Congressmen involved in drafting and studying proposed legislation'" (quoting
Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969))); Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244,
262 n.15 (1994) ("'[A] court would be well advised to take with a large grain of salt floor
debate and statements placed in the Congressional Record which purport to create an inter-
pretation for the legislation that is before us.'" (quoting 137 CONG. REc. S15,325 (Oct. 29,
1991) (statement of Sen. Danforth))); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416,
421 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that the Conference Report "is the most persuasive evidence of
congressional intent besides the statute itself"); Zolb v. Kelly (In reKelly), 841 F.2d 908, 912
n.3 (9th Cir. 1988) (commenting on how committee reports, not "[s]tray comments by
individual legislators," provide the best expression of legislative intent).
212 For a discussion of this veto message along with excerpted portions of the relevant
text, see supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
213 Havenick, 981 F. Supp. at 528 (quoting the president's veto message).
214 2 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (D. Colo. 1998).
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strong inference ... of scienter."215 Nonetheless, the court did not
rule out the possibility that a court occasionally might draw the requi-
site inference "solely from motive and opportunity allegations, '216 and
it stated that such allegations may be "relevant in determining
whether the totality of the allegations permits a strong inference of
fraud."217
The remaining five courts2 18 gave considerably less weight to the
legislative history and based their decisions primarily on plain mean-
ing arguments. The court's reasoning in In re Baesa is illustrative:
The statute, however, while adopting the "strong inference" require-
ment, makes no mention whatever of "motive and opportunity," nor
singles out any other special kind of particulars as presumptively
sufficient. The conclusion follows from the plain language of the
statute that the mere pleading of motive and opportunity does not,
of itself, automatically suffice to raise a strong inference of
scienter.219
The In re Baesa court supported its reliance on the statutory text by
quoting Supreme Court precedent on statutory interpretation which
held that "[w] hen the statutory text is so plain, resort to legislative
history is neither necessary nor prudent."220
215 Id. at 1359.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 See Miller v. Material Sciences Corp., 9 F. Supp. 2d 925 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Baffa v.
Donaldson, Lufkin &Jenrette Sec. Corp., 999 F. Supp. 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); In re Glenayre
Tech., Inc. Sec. Litig., 982 F. Supp. 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Press v. Quick & Reilly, No.
96C1V4278, 1997 WL 458666, at * 1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1997); In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F.
Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
219 In re Baesa, 969 F. Supp. at 242; see also Glenayre, 982 F. Supp. at 298 ("[T]he law in
this district... is that 'motive and opportunity' alone will no longer suffice to meet the
required pleading standard."); Press, 1997 WL 458666, at *2 ("Under the plain language of
the Reform Act, even if motive and opportunity are adequately plead, facts must still be
alleged that give rise to a strong inference of fraudulent intent."). The In re Baesa court
also considered in detail, and ultimately dismissed, the argument that Congress intended
to eliminate recklessness as a substantive basis for securities fraud liability. See In re Baesa,
969 F. Supp. at 240-42; see also infra note 272 and accompanying text (discussing the In re
Baesa court's reasoning).
220 In re Baesa, 969 F. Supp. at 241-42 (citing Director, Office of Workers' Compensa-
tion Programs v. Greenwich Colliers, 512 U.S. 267, 280 (1994); Shannon v. United States,
512 U.S. 573, 579 (1994); Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994)).
Interestingly, the In re Baesa and Press courts each found that their interpretation of
section 21D(b) (2)-that allegations of "motive and opportunity" do not presumptively es-
tablish a "strong inference'"-was, in fact, in accordance with Second Circuit precedent.
SeeIn reBaesa, 969 F. Supp. at 242 n.3 ("Even under prior Second Circuit precedent... it is
not entirely clear that the Court of Appeals always accepted mere allegations of motive and
opportunity as sufficient to establish scienter."); Press, 1997 WL 458666, at *2 n.2 ("The
scienter requirement of the Reform Act does not appear to depart from Second Circuit
precedent in that the Second Circuit has similarly required that the allegations of motive
and opportunity to commit fraud give rise to the strong inference of fraudulent intent.").
These two cases reflect, as did the congressional debate between Senators Specter and
Dodd, see supra text accompanying notes 148-54, confusion over the precise formulation of
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b. Standard #3: Elimination of Recklessness as a Substantive
Basis for Securities Fraud
Six courts22 1 have ruled that Congress did not restrict its reforms
to the pleading stage of securities fraud litigation; instead, these
courts have found that Congress intended to heighten both the plead-
ing and substantive standards for securities fraud. The courts in these
cases have interpreted section 21D (b) (2) to have both eliminated the
pleading of motive and opportunity as a sufficient basis for establish-
ing a strong inference of scienter and altered the underlying mental
state requirement of which a strong inference must be shown. In
short, these courts have held that the Reform Act eliminates liability
for recklessness in Rule lOb-5 222 actions.
i. Silicon Graphics I and II
In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Securities Litigation ("Silicon Graphics 1')
was the first case to conclude that section 21D (b) (2) eliminated reck-
lessness as a basis for securities fraud liability. 223 The court in Silicon
Graphics I engaged in the most thorough interpretation of the Reform
Act's legislative history to date. Because Silicon Graphics I is the only
case involving the interpretation of section 21D (b) (2) that a court has
reheard on appeal224 and because the SEC filed an amicus brief in
that appeal, it is a particularly important case.
The court in Silicon Graphics I began its analysis of section
21D(b) (2) with the House Conference Report. 225 Based on the lan-
guage stating that the "Conference Committee intend[ed] to
strengthen existing pleading requirements" 226 and on footnote 23 of
the Report,227 the court reasoned that the Conference Committee in-
the Second Circuit's two alternative tests. For further discussion regarding the intra-circuit
split on this issue, see infra Part IV.B.2.
221 See In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 96-73711-DT, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17262
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 18, 1997); Voit v. Wonderware Corp., 977 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Pa. 1997);
Powers v. Eichen, 977 F. Supp. 1031 (S.D. Cal. 1997); Friedberg v. Discreet Logic Inc., 959
F. Supp. 42 (D. Mass. 1997); Norwood Venture Corp. v. Converse Inc., 959 F. Supp. 205
(S.D.N.Y. 1997); In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 96-0393, 1996 WL 664639
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996); see also Chan v. Orthologic Corp., No. CIV-96-1514-PHX-RCB
(D. Ariz. Feb. 5, 1998) (stating, in dicta, that the Reform Act eliminated securities fraud
liability for recklessness).
222 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998).
223 No. C 96-0393, 1996 WL 664639 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996) [hereinafter Silicon
Graphics 1]; see also Powers v. Eichen, 977 F. Supp. 1031, 1039 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (following
Silicon Graphics 1).
224 See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Cal. 1997) [here-
inafter Silicon Graphics 17].
225 See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369 (1995), repinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730.
226 See id at 41, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740; see also supra text accompanying
note 135 (quoting relevant portion of the Conference Report).
227 See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 48 n.23; see also supra text accompanying note
136 (reprinting footnote 23).
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tended to "strengthen" the Second Circuit standard both by abrogat-
ing the motive and opportunity test and by narrowing the second test
to exclude recklessness22 8 -thereby confusing the distinction between
procedural and substantive law. Thus, the court concluded that a
plaintiff must allege specific facts that "create a strong inference of
knowing misrepresentation on the part of defendants."229 In support
of its conclusions, the court emphasized the Conference Committee's
decision to drop the Specter amendment and President Clinton's veto
message but accorded minimal weight to comments made by mem-
bers of both houses during floor discussion before and after the Presi-
dent's veto.2 0
The court supported its reliance on these pieces of the legislative
history with Supreme Court precedent on statutory interpretation.23 1
After referring to the House Conference Report as "the most defini-
tive part"23 2 of the legislative history, the court cited Supreme Court
precedent to explain that "'the authoritative source for finding the
Legislature's intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill, which
"represen[t] the considered and collective understanding of those
Congressmen involved in drafting and studying proposed legisla-
tion.""' 2 3 The court then justified relying on the Conference Com-
mittee's failure to retain the Specter amendment by quoting Supreme
Court precedent which stated that reason "'strongly militates against a
judgment that Congress intended a result that it expressly declined to
enact."' 234 Finally, the court reasoned that its interpretation of sec-
tion 21D(b) (2) was consistent with the Reform Act's larger policy ob-
jective of "discourag[ing] frivolous litigation" by implementing
"needed procedural protections."23 5
The confusion among the district courts regarding the proper in-
terpretation of section 21D(b) (2) and the dramatic effect that the
elimination of recklessness as a substantive basis for securities fraud
228 See Silicon Graphics 1, 1996 WL 664639, at *5-7.
229 Id. at *7.
230 See id. at *5-7. The court discussed statements made by Representative Blilely, see
141 CONG. R~c. H114,040 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995), and Senator Moseley-Braun, see id. at
S17,983 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995), made prior to the Presidential veto, and statements made
by Representatives Moran, see i& at H15,218 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995), Lofgren, see i&. at
H15,219, and Deutsch, see itd at H15,220, and Senators Domenici, see id. at S19,044-45,
19,150-151 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995), Dodd, see id. at S19,068, and Bradley, see id. at S19,149
(daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995), made after the Presidential veto. See Silicon Graphics I, 1996 WL
66439, at *6.
231 See id
232 Id. at *6 n.4.
233 Id. at *6. (quoting Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (quoting Zuber v.
Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969))).
234 Id. (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974)).




would have on the U.S. securities markets23 6 prompted the SEC to file
an amicus curiae brief in the rehearing of In re Silicon Graphics, Inc.
Securities Litigation ("Silicon Graphics I').237 The SEC argued that the
Reform Act did not eliminate recklessness as a substantive basis for
liability and drew attention to the fact that section 21D(b) (2), "by its
express terms," applies only to the pleading stage of Rule lOb-5 ac-
tions.238 The SEC noted, "In determining that section 21D(b) (2) re-
quired the pleading of conscious behavior, the court drew from a
purely procedural provision the incorrect conclusion that Congress
had eliminated a well established substantive standard."23 9 The SEC
rejected Silicon Graphics T's determination that footnote 23 implied a
narrower interpretation of the second test that the Second Circuit had
developed and pointed to an inconsistency between the footnote and
the final version of the pleading standard as it appeared in the House
Conference Report. The SEC argued that the court's "conclusion was
reached in spite of the fact that in deleting the [Specter] amendment,
the Conference Committee deleted not only the language regarding
motive, opportunity, and recklessness, but also the language regard-
ing conscious misbehavior."240 According to the SEC, footnote 23 ex-
plains the Conference Committee's "decision not to codify the
Second Circuit's case law interpreting the standard[,] . . .preferring
to leave to the courts the discretion to create their own standards for
determining whether" the plaintiff has established a strong
inference. 241
The court in Silicon Graphics !1 brushed aside the SEC's argument
that the Reform Act intended to heighten only the pleading, and not
the substantive, requirements for securities fraud. The court instead
chose to engage in a lengthy discussion of the development and cur-
rent state of the substantive scienter requirement.2 42 The Silicon
Graphics IT court ultimately concluded that section 21D (b) (2) was in-
tended both to abrogate the Second Circuit's motive and opportunity
test and to narrow the second test to include "deliberate recklessness"
but to exclude "non-deliberate recklessness. '243 Although the court
offered a less extreme interpretation than it did in Silicon Graphics I, in
that it expressly accepted some form of recklessness as a basis for se-
236 See SEC Amicus Brief, supra note 47, at 3. The SEC argued that a "higher scienter
standard would lessen the incentives for corporations to conduct a full inquiry into poten-
tially troublesome or embarrassing areas[, would encourage] ... deliberate ignorance...
[,]and would greatly erode the deterrent effect of Section 10(b) actions." Id.
237 970 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
238 SEC Amicus Brief, supra note 47, at 8.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 12.
241 Id. at 12-13.
242 See Silicon Graphics Hf, 970 F. Supp. at 754-56.
243 Id. at 757.
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curities fraud, it nevertheless interpreted section 21D (b) (2) to have
altered the substantive scienter requirement for securities fraud.244
In reaching this conclusion, the Silicon Graphics II court failed to
distinguish between two conceptually distinct standards-the scienter
pleading standard (what a complaint must allege to successfully with-
stand a motion to dismiss) and the substantive scienter requirement
(the mental state that a plaintiff must prove at trial). Conflating these
substantive and procedural requirements, the Silicon Graphics II court
interpreted the language in both the House Conference Report,
which states that section 21D (b) (2) was based on the Second Circuit's
strong inference standard, and related footnote 23245 as pertaining to
Second Circuit case law interpreting the underlying substantive scien-
ter requirements for securities fraud.246 Thus, the court all but ig-
nored Second Circuit case law interpreting the strong inference
pleading standard and instead identified three distinct lines of cases
defining scienter in Second Circuit case law.247 After considering
each of these three lines of cases, the court adopted the Weschler v.
Steinberg48 line, which requires a plaintiff to establish "actual intent"
to satisfy the scienter element of securities fraud.249 The Silicon Graph-
ics II court based this approach on the Conference Committee's fail-
ure to codify "motive, opportunity or recklessness" in footnote 23 of
244 See id. at 754.
245 The relevant portions of the House Conference Report and related footnote are
reprinted supra text accompanying notes 135-36.
246 See Silicon Graphics 1, 970 F. Supp. at 755-57. Though misdirected, the court's in-
quiry does uncover a subtle issue that no other court identified: in order for sec-
tion 21D(b)(2) to "'establish uniform and more stringent pleading requirements,"' a
stated purpose of the Reform Act, the definition of scienter must be uniform. Id. at 755-56
(quoting H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
740). Put another way, there cannot be uniformity among the circuits if the underlying
definition of scienter differs, even if the pleading requirements for the scienter element of
securities fraud are identical. This is because pleading standards are dependent upon sub-
stantive standards in that a complaint must plead facts that tend to establish (according to
the stringency of the standard) the substantive requirement.
247 See Silicon Graphics II, 970 F. Supp. at 755. The court identified three lines of cases:
(1) the Lanza line of cases, see Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973), under
which "unqualified allegations of recklessness suffice to establish scienter," Silicon Graphics
II, 970 F. Supp. at 755; (2) the Ro/fline of cases, see Rolf v. Blythe, Eastman Dillon & Co.,
570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), amended by 1978 WL 4098 (2d Cir. May 22, 1978), affd in part and
rev'd in part, 637 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1980), which "allows recklessness to support scienter only
if the defendant had a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff," Silicon Graphics 1, 970 F. Supp. at
755; and (3) the Wechsler line of cases, see Wechsler v. Steinberg, 733 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir.
1984), which according to the court "require[s] actual intent or circumstances implying
actual intent before finding scienter," Silicon Graphics II, 970 F. Supp. at 755. SeeVanyo et
al., supra note 61, at 75-78 (identifying these same three lines of cases).
248 733 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1984).
249 See Silicon Graphics II, 970 F. Supp. at 755; see also id. at 756 ("In excluding from the
[Reform Act's] pleading standard language relating to motive, opportunity, or reckless-
ness, Congress appears to have rejected the Lanza and Roiflines of cases in favor of the




the House Conference Report.2 50 The court then defined "actual in-
tent" to include "deliberate recklessness." 251 The court supported its
argument that Congress intended to eliminate liability for reckless-
ness in the fact that both an early version of the House bill 252 and the
Specter amendment 253 included definitions of recklessness and ulti-
mately were dropped from the Reform Act bill.2 54 The Silicon Graphics
H court further supported this interpretation by pointing to Con-
gress's override of President Clinton's veto,2 55 which had objected to
the Reform Act bill's "crystal clear" intent to create a pleading stan-
dard more stringent than that of the Second Circuit.256
ii. Friedberg, Norwood Venture, and In Re Comshare
The courts in Friedberg v. Discreet Logic Inc.,257 Norwood Venture
Corp. v. Converse Inc.,258 and In re Comshare, Inc. Securities Litigation259
tightly circumscribed their analyses to the pleading stage of securities
fraud. These courts concluded that section 21D(b) (2) heightened
the scienter pleading standard by no longer permitting a complaint
that alleged recklessness to satisfy the strong inference of scienter re-
quirement.260 In reaching this conclusion, all three courts failed to
grasp fully the division, or the relationship, between procedural and
substantive rules. None of these courts expressly recognized that dis-
allowing a complaint alleging recklessness to satisfy the pleading re-
quirement effectively eliminates recklessness as a ground for
substantive liability.2 6' Thus, the Fiedberg, Norwood Venture, and In re
Comshare courts eliminated recklessness as a substantive basis for se-
curities fraud by implication.
All three courts focused primarily on the House Conference Re-
port. However, the Norwood Venture and In re Comshare courts consid-
ered the legislative history only cursorily. Relying on the language in
the House Conference Report (stating that the Conference Commit-
250 See id. at 756.
251 Id. at 757.
252 See supra text accompanying notes 83-87.
253 The Specter amendment did not, in fact, define "recklessness." See supra text ac-
companying note 118.
254 Silicon Graphics ii, 970 F. Supp. at 756.
255 The relevant text of the President's veto message is reprinted supra text accompany-
ing note 156.
256 Silicon Graphics I, 970 F. Supp. at 756.
257 959 F. Supp. 42 (D. Mass. 1997); see also Voit v. Wonderware Corp., 977 F. Supp.
363, 374 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (following Fiedberg).
258 959 F. Supp. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
259 No. 96-73711-DT, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17262 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 18, 1997).
260 See Friedberg, 959 F. Supp. at 49-50; Norwood, 959 F. Supp. at 208; In re Comshar4 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17262, at *16.
261 The only other possible option would be to require a plaintiff to plead more than
she would have to prove at trial-a preposterous result.
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tee sought to "strengthen existing pleading requirements" 262), foot-
note 23,263 and President Clinton's veto message (stating that the
Conference Committee had intended to "raise the [pleading] stan-
dard even beyond that level [of the Second Circuit] 264 ) these two
courts concluded that section 21D (b) (2) required a plaintiff to "plead
specific facts that 'create a strong inference of knowing misrepresenta-
tion on the part of the defendants.' '265
By contrast, the Friedberg court considered the legislative history
more carefully. Finding that the text of the Reform Act does not offer
a clear interpretation of the words "strong inference," the court
turned to the legislative history for guidance. 266 The Friedberg court
first considered the House Conference Report and deduced from it
that the conferees intended to create a pleading standard "even
stronger than the existing Second Circuit standard."267 In addition,
because the court believed that the Specter amendment contained
the "Second Circuit standard and case law," it found the rejection of
the amendment by the Conference Committee dispositive.268 In sup-
port of this reasoning, the court cited Supreme Court precedent to
explain that "'Congress does not intend sub silentio to enact statutory
language that it has earlier discarded in favor of other language."' 269
The Friedberg court parsed the House Conference Report language
and concluded that the Conference Committee's reference to "mo-
tive, opportunity and recklessness" in footnote 23 indicated that the
Second Circuit case law's development of these approaches was insuf-
ficiently stringent.270 The court then applied deductive logic and re-
tained what remained of the Second Circuit test, namely the pleading
of "conscious behavior," which the Fiedberg court defined as "intent to
defraud or knowledge of... falsity."271 In this way, the Friedberg court
262 H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.CA.N. 730, 740;
see also supra text accompanying note 135 (reprinting relevant portion of the Conference
Report).
263 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 48 n.23; see also supra text accompanying note
136 (reprinting footnote 23).
264 Veto Message, supra note 155, at 1912; see also supra text accompanying note 156
(reprinting relevant portion of the veto message).
265 Norwood, 959 F. Supp. at 208 (quoting Silicon Graphics I, 1996 WL 664639, at *7
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996)); accord In re Comshare 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17262, at *19.
266 See Friedberg v. Discrest Logic, Inc., 959 F. Supp. 42, 48-49 (D. Mass. 1997).
267 1d. at 48. In reaching this conclusion, the Friedberg court analyzed the language of
the House Conference Report in more detail than any other district court. The court
pointed out that the conferees considered the Second Circuit standard to be the "'most
stringent pleading standard'" of all the circuits. Id. (quoting H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369,
at 41, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740). The court then concluded that the word
"existing" in the sentence reading "intends to strengthen existing pleading requirements"
necessarily referred to the Second Circuit's standard. See id.
268 Id. at 48-49.
269 Id. at 49 (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 442-43 (1987)).
270 Id.
271 Id. at 49 n.2.
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felt it had implemented congressional intent as evidenced in the
House Conference Report. As the court summarized:
The Conference Committee Report retained the "conscious be-
havior" pleading approach and under Second Circuit case law the
strength of the evidence needed to constitute conscious behavior is
greater than that required for the motive and opportunity or reck-
less behavior approaches .... [T]his Court rules that the plaintiff
must set forth specific facts that constitute strong circumstantial evi-




Except for the handful of courts that ceased their inquiry with the
statutory language of section 21D(b) (2)-taking what can be labeled
as a "textualist" interpretive approach-none of the district courts dis-
cussed above explicitly identified the interpretive methodology they
used to decipher the meaning of section 21D(b) (2). Rather, these
courts, as a group and individually, employed a mixture of interpre-
tive arguments, including arguments based upon the statutory text of
section 21D(b) (2) and the Reform Act, arguments grounded in the
272 Id. at 49-50. The courts in In re Baesa Securities Litigation, 969 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y.
1997), and Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharmaceutical Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297 (C.D.
Cal. 1996), engaged in detailed consideration of congressional intent although they ulti-
mately concluded that Congress did not aim to eradicate recklessness as a substantive basis
for securities fraud. See supra Part III.B.1-2(a).
The Marksman court acknowledged that the House of Representatives had eliminated
recklessness as a substantive basis of liability in its early version of the bill, see supra notes 77-
78 and accompanying text, but recognized that House Bill 1058, as adopted by the House,
see supra text accompanying note 99, "expressly provided for liability based on reckless
conduct." Marksman, 927 F. Supp. at 1309 n.9. The Marksman court used a portion of the
House Conference Report which stated that "the Conference Committee explicitly deter-
mined that the legislation should make no change to the state of mind requirements of
existing law," H.R. CoNF. REL. No. 104-369, at 38 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 737, to support its conclusion that the substantive requirements of securities fraud
have not been altered. See Marksman, 927 F. Supp. at 1309 n.9. For further support, the
court invoked the interpretive argument that "[1legislative silence . . . does not give the
court grounds to conclude that recklessness is no longer an adequate basis to establish
scienter." Id.
The court in In re Baesa briefly traced the judicial history of the scienter element of
securities fraud, from the Supreme Court's decision in Ernst &Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 193 n.12 (1976), to reserve ruling on whether recklessness qualifies as scienter, to the
near universal acceptance of recklessness as a form of scienter in the circuit courts, and
concluded that "nothing in the Reform Act purports" to overrule recklessness as being
sufficient under the Hochfelder definition of scienter. In re Baesa, 969 F. Supp. at 241. Inter-
estingly, the In re Baesa court interpreted the decisions in Silicon Graphics I, Friedberg, and
Norwood "as simply reinforcing the requirement that recklessness... includes a conscious
component." In re Baesa, 969 F. Supp. at 241 n.1.
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traditional canons of statutory construction,273 arguments based upon
the larger policy goals of the Reform Act, and arguments drawn from
the legislative history274 of section 21D (b) (2).
Despite this somewhat ad hoc approach, the district courts pri-
marily engaged in the latter "contextualist" approach. Contextualist
methodology stands diametrically opposed to textualist methodol-
ogy275 and considers the meaning of an ambiguous statutory provision
within the context of legislative intent, as evidenced by legislative his-
tory.276 By contrast, the textualist approach urges courts to restrict
themselves to the text and structure of the statute in question when
interpreting the meaning of an ambiguous or vague provision. 277 By
focusing on "plain meaning" arguments rooted in the "text," textual-
ists, most notably justice Antonin Scalia, demonstrate a skepticism for
legislative history and seek to avoid it altogether.278
In analyzing the meaning of section 21D(b) (2), this Note does
not restrict itself to any one interpretive methodology. Instead, it
273 The canons of statutory construction are the traditional starting points for a court.
See ROBERT A. KATzmANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 48 (1997). For an exhaustive study of the
different types of interpretational arguments, see Robert S. Summers, Statutory Interpretation
in the United States, in INTERPRETING STATUTES 407 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Sum-
mers eds., 1991). For general studies of the traditional approaches to statutory construc-
tion, see NoRMANJ. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (5th ed. 1992); David
L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 921 (1992).
According to Katzmann, the canons of statutory construction include the principles that
"the starting point is the language of the statute; if the language is plain, construction is
unnecessary; ... the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another; ... and every
word of a statute must be given significance." KATZMANN, supra, at 49.
274 Very generally, contextualist interpretive methodology holds that legislative history
can be used in a number of circumstances, such as to clarify the meaning or purpose of
technical or nontechnical words or phrases, or "to promote fidelity to congressional mean-
ing and coherence in the law" when a controversial statute is silent on a contested issue.
KATzMANN, supra note 273, at 62. See generally Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative
History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 847 (1992) (defending the use of
legislative history); George A. Costello, Average Voting Members and Other "Benign Fictions":
The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, RoorDebates, and Other Sources of Legislative History,
1990 DUKE LJ. 39, 61-72 (discussing new approaches when relying on legislative history);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479, 1481-82
(1987) (arguing that statutes should be interpreted dynamically in their current context);
AbnerJ. Mikva, A Reply to judge Starr's Observations, 1987 DUKE LJ. 380, 382 (arguing for the
use of legislative history in interpreting statutes); Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone,
Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. Rxv. 561, 594-77
(1992) (examining actions Congress can take to control judicial abuse of statutory inter-
pretation). As several of the district courts duly noted, committee reports are generally
understood to be the most definite expressions of legislative intent. See Havenick v. Net-
work Express, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 480, 527 (E.D. Mich. 1997); In re Silicon Graphics, Inc.
Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746, 757 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S.
70, 76 (1984), for the proposition that committee reports are the authoritative expression
of legislative intent, but arriving at separate interpretations of that intent); KATzMAsN,
supra note 273, at 63.
275 See KATZMANN, supra note 273, at 59.
276 See id. at 62.
277 See id.
278 See id. at 59-62.
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adopts a mixed approach and interprets section 21D (b) (2) in light of
the statutory text, the legislative history, and the larger policy goals of
the Reform Act and the federal securities laws. This Note concludes
that section 21D (b) (2) did not alter the substantive scienter element
of Rule 10b-5 securities fraud by eliminating liability for reckless con-
duct. With regard to the question of whether section 21D(b) (2) cre-
ates a pleading standard more stringent than that of the Second
Circuit, this Note demonstrates that even after thorough considera-
tion of the legislative history, the related policy concerns, and the une-
ven legal landscape upon which Congress legislated, the evidence
weighs fairly evenly in favor of both conclusions. Thus, as the next
section demonstrates, the text of section 21D (b) (2) must ultimately
control.
B. Deducing the Pleading Standard
1. Section 21D(b)(2) Does Not Eliminate Liability for Recklessness
The argument that section 21D(b) (2) altered the substantive re-
quirements for securities fraud by eliminating liability for recklessness
suffers from serious weaknesses. The text of the Reform Act, a pre-
ponderance of the legislative history, and the history and larger policy
goals of the federal securities laws dictate that section 21D(b) (2) only
heightened the requirements of pleading scienter.
a. The Text of the Reform Act
The text of section 21D(b)(2) offers the most conclusive evi-
dence that Congress did not intend to alter the substantive require-
ments for securities fraud actions by enacting the Reform Act. Once
again, the text of section 21D(b) (2) bears repeating:
REQUIRED STATE OF MnD.- In any private action arising under this
title in which the plaintiff may recover money damages only on
proof that the defendant acted with a particular state of mind, the
complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged to vio-
late this tile, state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong in-
ference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.2 79
Although Congress placed section 21D(b)(2) under the title "Re-
quirements for securities fraud actions,"'280 and thus did not specifi-
cally refer to the pleading stage of litigation, all the other provisions
under this title pertain solely to procedural requirements. 28' Further-
279 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2) (Supp. II 1996).
280 Id. § 78u-4(b). The title section to section 21D (b) (2) was, in fact, worded after the
title section in the House bill. See H.R. 10, 104th Cong. § 204 (1995).
281 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (1) (requiring complaints to state with specificity all al-
leged misleading statements); id. § 78u4(b) (3) (B) (staying discovery pending motions to
dismiss); id. § 78u-4(b) (4) (placing the burden of proving the causation element of securi-
ties fraud upon the plaintiff).
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more, the language of section 21D (b) (2) refers to the requirements
of a "complaint" and is directed solely at the procedural requirements
of pleading securities fraud. Moreover, by including the language "ac-
ted with the required state of mind," section 21D (b) (2) carefully brackets
the issue of the substantive scienter requirement of securities fraud.
Two versions of the House bill did include provisions pertaining to
the underlying scienter requirements of securities fraud, and in fact,
referred specifically to liability for reckless misconduct. The initial ver-
sion of the House bill eliminated liability for recklessness, 282 and the
final version explicitly included and defined liability for reckless-
ness.283 However, the House's inclusion of language pertaining to lia-
bility for recklessness and use of the term "recklessness" itself in the
early versions of the bill support the conclusion that in ultimately re-
maining completely silent on the issue, Congress did not intend to
eliminate liability for recklessness. 284
The language of other Reform Act provisions and the language in
the House Conference Report explaining those provisions provide in-
direct support for the proposition that section 21D (b) (2) heightens
only the pleading requirements for securities fraud. For example, a
separate Reform Act provision, new section 21D(g),285 does in fact
heighten the substantive scienter requirement with respect to the
damages aspect of securities fraud, but leaves liability standards un-
touched. To the contrary, in requiring a defendant to have acted
"knowingly" in order to be subject to joint and several damages, sec-
tion 21D(g) explicitly states that "[n]othing in this subsection shall be
construed to create, affect, or in any manner modify, the standard for
liability associated with any action arising under the securities laws. '286
Additionally, language in the House Conference Report explaining
the new damages provision, reinforces this point: in eliminating joint
and several liability for
cases involving non-knowing securities violations, the Conference
Committee explicitly determined that the legislation should make
no change to the state of mind requirements of existing law; ...
[Section 21D(g)] further provides that the standard of liability in
any such action should be determined by the pre-existing, un-
amended statutory provision that creates the cause of action, with-
out regard to this provision, which applies solely to the allocation of
damages.287
282 See supra text accompanying note 78.
283 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
284 The Supreme Court endorsed this interpretive argument in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp
Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974).
285 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(g) (2) (A).
286 Id. § 78u-4(g) (1).
287 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 38 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.AN. 730, 737.
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Although somewhat strained, the courts in Silicon Graphics land 11
did provide a counterargument to this point. The courts argued that
the absence of similar language in yet another provision pertaining to
substantive mental state requirements undermines the explanatory
language in section 21D(g) and the House Conference Report.28
The courts pointed to new section 21E(c),28 9 which explicitly excludes
a "safe harbor" for defendants who have made "forward-looking"290
statements with "actual knowledge ... that the statement[s were] false
or misleading" 291 but which nowhere explicitly limits changes to sub-
stantive scienter requirements to this subsection. However, this asym-
metry-section 21D(g) includes limiting language which section 21E
does not-can be easily explained. Section 21E pertains only to the
safe harbor for forward-looking statements, whereas section 21D per-
tains to many different procedural provisions, 292 making it more nec-
essary to be explicit about how changes to one subsection affect other
subsections.
b. The Legislative History
As Parts II and IH demonstrated, a thorough investigation of the
Reform Act's legislative history permits more than one interpretation
of section 21D (b) (2) 's meaning. In attempting to divine legislative
intent, the district courts, though ultimately coming to three distinct
conclusions, relied on similar principles of statutory interpretation.2 93
As two courts2 9 4 correctly identified, congressional committee reports
are traditionally understood as the most reliable sources of legislative
intent.295 If one reads the House Conference Report, in particular
the sentence stating that the "Conference Committee intends to
288 See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp.. 746, 757 (N.D. Cal. 1997); In
re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 96-0393, 1996 WL 664639, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
25, 1996).
289 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c).
290 For a definition of forward-looking statements, see id. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A).
291 See id § 78u-5 (c) (1) (B).
292 Compare id. § 78u-4(g) (dealing with "proportionate liability"), with id § 78u-4(c)
(dealing with "sanctions for abusive litigation").
293 See supra text accompanying notes 190, 205, 219, 269.
294 See Havenick v. Network Express, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 480, 527-28 (E.D. Mich. 1997);
In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746, 757 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
295 See Garcia v. U.S., 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) ("The authoritative source for finding the
Legislature's intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill, which 'represen[t] the con-
sidered and collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and study-
ing proposed legislation'" (quoting Zuber v. Allen, 369 U.S. 168, 186 (1969))); see also
Costello, supra note 274, at 41 (explaining that "[t]he case for considering floor debates as
inherently more reliable than committee reports is weak"); William N. Eskridge Jr., The
New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621, 636 (1990) (providing a chart of the most and least
authoritative pieces of legislative history); Mikva, supra note 274, at 385 (explaining that "I
always find that the committee report is the most useful device."). But see Wisconsin Pub.
Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 621 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[W]e are a Gov-
ernment of laws, not of committee reports.").
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strengthen existing pleading requirements," 296 in conjunction with
the language in footnote 23 that states "for this reason, the Confer-
ence Report chose not to include in the pleading standard certain
language relating to . .. recklessness, 297 one can make several argu-
ments that the Committee intended to eliminate liability for reckless-
ness. After all, Congress certainly considered the idea: the first
version of the House bill had eliminated liability for recklessness. 298
In fact, the Reform Act, as enacted, did alter the substantive scienter
requirement forjoint and several liability299 and created a safe harbor
for forward-looking statements0° precisely by eliminating liability for
recklessness. Strictly speaking, as the courts in Friedberg and Norwood
Venture301 demonstrated, perhaps unwittingly, one may heighten a
pleading requirement by altering the requirements of the substantive
element to be pled.302
At first blush, the three-way split in Second Circuit case law that
Silicon Graphics I!identified30 3 also supports an interpretation that the
House Conference Report intended to eliminate liability for reckless-
ness. As the Silicon Graphics 11 court accurately discovered, the Wechsler
v. Steinbere 0 4 line of cases has never defined "scienter" to include
reckless conduct for purposes of Rule lOb-5 securities fraud305-de-
spite the near universal acceptance among the circuits of recklessness
as a form of scienter.30 6 If a court knew about the Wechsler line of
cases, it could point to the language in the House Conference Report
which states that Congress based section 21D(b) (2) "in part on the
pleading standard of the Second Circuit to show Congress intended to
eliminate liability for recklessness." 30 7 Therefore, according to this ar-
gument, the Second Circuit's Wechsler line of cases is more stringent
than the Second Circuit's pleading requirement (i.e., In re Time
296 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.G.A.N 730, 740.
297 Id. at 48 n.23, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.CAN. 730, 747 n.23.
298 See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
299 See 15 U.S.C. § 7 8u-4(g) (2) (A)-(B) (Supp. II 1996).
300 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5.
301 See supra Part III.B.2 (b) (ii).
302 As discussed previously, this is because the stringency of a scienter pleading re-
quirement is, to a certain extent, dependent upon the stringency of the scienter require-
ment (e.g., if liability for recklessness is eliminated, a plaintiff's complaint must plead that
the defendant acted more than "recklessly," namely, "knowingly."). See supra Part I.B.1.
303 See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746, 755 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
304 733 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1984).
305 Silicon Graphics II, 970 F. Supp. at 755; see also Vanyo et al., supra note 61, at 75-78
(identifying the Wechsler line of cases). The Vanyo article identifies twelve cases in the
Wechsler line, extending from 1984 to 1993. See id. at 76 n.1.
306 See In re Baesa Inc. Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (collecting
cases); SEC Amicus Brief, supra note 47, at 5 n.4 (same); Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 3, at
843 n.320 (same).
307 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.AN. 730, 740.
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Warner Inc. Securities Litigation308 ) precisely because it does not include
reckless conduct as grounds for securities fraud liability.
These arguments, however, ultimately fail. First, the Committee
specifically entitled the portion of the House Conference Report that
explains section 21D (b) (2) "Heightened pleading standard."30 9 The
House Conference Report refers to FRCP Rule 9(b) throughout this
explanatory section,310 which pertains solely to the pleading stage of
litigation. Furthermore, nowhere in the legislative history, not even in
a single stray comment on the House or Senate floor, is there evi-
dence that Congress either misunderstood the distinction between
the substantive and procedural requirements of securities fraud or
sought to heighten the pleading standard for the scienter element of
securities fraud by fusing these two notions. Similarly, neither the
Wechsler line of cases nor the existence of a three-way split in Second
Circuit case law was ever the topic of congressional debate. The three-
way split in Second Circuit case law pertains solely to the substantive
requirements of scienter and therefore has no bearing on either sec-
tion 21D(b) (2) or the language of the House Conference Report.
Thus, Silicon Graphics Ii's conclusion that section 21D(b) (2) elimi-
nated liability for recklessness is founded on a forced interpretation of
three sentences in the House Conference Report, read in the false
context of an intracircuit split that relates to a nongermane area of
law.31'
To conclude that Congress intended to eliminate securities fraud
liability for recklessness also requires one to ignore the great bulk of
308 9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993); see discussion supra Part I.B.3.
309 H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740.
310 See id.; supra Part IA.
311 The Silicon Graphics HI decision, see supra notes 236-54 and accompanying text, and
the Vanyo article, see Vanyo et al., supra note 61, reflect conceptual confusion regarding
the Second Circuit's case law. Both the court in Silicon Graphics H and the Vanyo article
identify the Wechsler v. Steinberg, 733 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1984), line of cases as defining
scienter to exclude recklessness, and a second line of cases as specifically including reck-
lessness. See Silicon Graphics I, 970 F. Supp. at 755; Vanyo et al., supra note 61, at 76-77. The
Silicon Graphics II court identifies the second line as the Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d
1277 (2d Cir. 1973), line. See Silicon Graphics II, 970 F. Supp. at 755. As noted earlier,
Wechsler and Lanza form opposing lines of case law with respect to the substantive scienter
requirements of securities fraud. See supra note 247. The Vanyo article identifies the sec-
ond line of cases to include In re Time Warner Inc. Securities Litigation, 9 F.3d 259 (2d
Cir.1993). See Vanyo et al., supra note 61, at 76-77. In so doing, the article sets up a false
opposition between case lav pertaining to the substantive requirements of securities fraud
(i.e., the Wechsler line), and a line of cases pertaining to the pleading requirements of
securities fraud (i.e., the In re Time Warnerline). The Vanyo article makes another concep-
tual mistake by including Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.
1987), among the Wechslerline of cases. SeeVanyo, supra note 61, at 94 n.1. The article fits
Beck into the Weschler line of cases by reading Beck's requirement that the defendant act
with "conscious knowledge" to exclude recklessness. In so doing, it ignores the fact that
many courts, including courts in the Second Circuit, have interpreted "conscious knowl-
edge" to include "recklessness,"just as they have interpreted "scienter" to include "reckless-
ness." SeeJohnson, supra note 59, at 685.
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other aspects of the Reform Act's legislative history. Both the Senate
Report312 and key exchanges between Senators Specter and Dodd313
indicate that Congress focused solely on the pleadings. A majority of
the courts also relied upon President Clinton's veto message 314 to rule
that section 21D (b) (2) eliminated liability for recklessness. However,
courts must keep the President's interpretation of section 21D (b) (2)
distinct from the legislature's intent.31 5 Not only might the Presi-
dent's political orientation influence his interpretation, which would
warrant giving it minimal weight, but also the veto message itself, in
decrying the stringency of section 21D (b) (2),316 nowhere implies that
the President understood the Conference Committee to have altered
substantive requirements.
The Supreme Court's latest rulings on statutory interpretation
also weigh against interpreting section 21D (b) (2) to have eliminated
securities fraud liability for recklessness. Shannon v. United States317
presented the Supreme Court with a statute that was ambiguous as to
what jury instructions courts should give in connection with the in-
sanity defense. 318 The Senate Report accompanying the statute specif-
ically endorsed the procedure used by the D.C. Circuit, but the statute
itself contained no language that reflected this procedure. 319 The
Court ruled that a statement made in the legislative history of a statute
will not receive interpretive weight if it is "in no way anchored in the
text of the statute."320 Although Shannon dealt with a single statement
made in the legislative history of a statute, the principle laid down in
Shannon clearly applies to any "snippet of legislative history."321
The two or three statements contained in the House Conference
Report for the Reform Act which support the interpretation that sec-
tion 21D (b) (2) eliminated liability for recklessness are, at most, mere
"snippets" of legislative history. Indeed, these two statements are ar-
guably less than snippets. The statement at issue in Shannon was a
clear endorsement of D.C. Circuit procedure, whereas only a strained
reading of the statement and related footnote in the Reform Act's
House Conference Report supports a congressional intention to elimi-
nate liability for recklessness. Moreover, and as previously discussed,
312 See supra text accompanying notes 112-13.
313 See supra text accompanying notes 148-64.
314 See Veto Message, supra note 155; see also supra note 156 (quoting a relevant portion
of the veto message).
315 See Coffee, supra note 16, at 524.
316 See Veto Message, supra note 155, at 1912 ("[Tjhe pleading requirements of the
Conference Report with regard to a defendant's state of mind impose an unacceptable
procedural hurdle to meritorious claims ... ").
317 512 U.S. 573 (1994).
318 See id. at 575.
319 See id. at 583-84.




no language in section 21D(b) (2) purports to alter the substantive
scienter requirements for securities fraud; in fact, the term "reckless-
ness" does not even appear. Thus, the proposition that section
21D (b) (2) eliminated liability for recklessness is not "anchored" in
the text and therefore must be rejected.
The principle that courts should defer to the statutory interpreta-
tion of the administrative agency that administers the statute, as enun-
ciated in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 322 also weighs against a finding that section 21D(b) (2) elimi-
nated liability for recklessness.3 23 Admittedly, one can apply argu-
ments grounded in the Chevron doctrine to the issue at hand only by
analogy. Strictly speaking, the Chevron doctrine applies only to judi-
cial review of an administrative agency's judicial ruling 24 and thus
arguably does not extend to the SEC's interpretation of section
21D (b) (2) in an amicus curiae brief. Moreover, under the Chevron
doctrine, a court accords judicial deference only when the agency "ad-
ministers" the statute in question,3 25 and the Reform Act, which is pri-
marily concerned with court procedure, pertains to an area of law
"where the SEC has neither primary jurisdiction nor special exper-
tise. '3 26 However, the substantive requirements of Rule 1Ob-5 securi-
ties fraud are certainly an area of the SEC's expertise. Thus, the
extreme interpretation that section 21D (b) (2) eliminated liability for
recklessness converts at least this aspect of the Reform Act into a sub-
ject of SEC jurisdiction. According to Chevron, when the text of the
statute is "silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency's [interpretation] is
based on a permissible construction of the statute."3 27 The SEC's
thorough analysis and interpretation3 28 of section 21D(b) (2) is clearly
a more permissible construction of both the statute and the Reform
Act's legislative history than a district court's construction that section
21D (b) (2) eliminated liability for recklessness. It follows that courts
should seriously consider the SEC's position that section 21D (b) (2) in
no way alters the substantive requirements of securities fraud. 329
322 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
323 See Coffee, supra note 16, at 518 (arguing that because of the Chewron doctrine of
deference to agencies, the SEC "could have an even more decisive role than the courts in
shaping the [Reform Act]").
324 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
325 See id. at 843-44.
326 Coffee, supra note 16, at 518.
327 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
328 See SEC Amicus Brief, supra note 47.
329 See id. The SEC recently reaffirmed its position that the Reform Act did not elimi-
nate securities fraud liability for reckless conduct during the legislative debate surrounding
the newly passed Securities Litigation Standards Act of 1998 ("Uniform Standards Act"),
Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.),
which preempts plaintiffs from bringing securities fraud class actions under state law. In
March 1998, Chairman Arthur Levitt and several SEC commissioners agreed to support the
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c. History and Policy Considerations
Both the history of the scienter element of securities fraud and
policy considerations argue against the conclusion that section
21D(b)(2) eliminated securities fraud liability for reckless miscon-
duct. After the Supreme Court decided in Ernst & Ernst v.
HochfelderY30 not to explicitly define the scienter element of Rule 10b-5
securities fraud to include recklessness, nearly every circuit has held
that some level of recklessness gives rise to liability for securities
preemption legislation in return for assurances made by several senators that the legislative
record would include statements to the effect that Congress had not intended section
21D(b) (2) to eliminate recklessness as a substantive basis for securities fraud. See Letter
from Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Isaac C. Hunt, Jr., Commissioner, and Laura S. Unger,
Commissioner, to Sen. Alfonse D'Amato, Sen. Phil Gramm, and Sen. ChristopherJ. Dodd
(Mar. 24, 1998), reprinted in 144 CONG. REc. S4780 (daily ed. May 13, 1998); Letter from
Sen. Alfonse M. D'Amato, Sen. Phil Gramm, and Sen. ChristopherJ. Dodd to Arthur Lev-
itt, Chairman, SEC (Mar. 24, 1998) (stating that "our clear intent in 1995 ... was that the
[Reform Act] did not in any way alter the scienter standard ... [and] [w]e intend to
restate these facts... in both the legislative history and the floor debate that will accom-
pany [the preemption bill]"). The Clinton administration also predicated its support for
the preemption legislation on congressional clarification that it had not intended to eradi-
cate securities fraud liability for reckless conduct. See Letter from Bruce Lindsey, Assistant
to the President and Deputy Counsel, and Gene Sperling, Assistant to the President for
Economic Policy, to Chairman D'Amato, Chairman Graham, and Sen. Dodd (Apr. 28,
1998), reprinted in 144 CONG. REc. 84781 (daily ed. May 13, 1998) (stating that "it is particu-
larly important to the President that [Congress] be clear that federal law to be applied
includes recklessness as a basis for pleading and liability in securities fraud class actions").
A prearranged colloquy between Senators Dodd and D'Amato, in which both clarified
their previous intentions that the Reform Act was not meant to eliminate liability for reck-
lessness, took place on the Senate floor on May 13, 1998. See 144 CONG. REC. S4798 (daily
ed. May 13, 1998) (floor debate on Senate Bill 1260). Language to the same effect also was
included in the Statement of Managers of the Conference Report on the Uniform Stan-
dards Act. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-803, at 15 (1998), reprinted in 144 CONG. REc.
H11,020-21 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1998) ("Congress did not, in adopting the Reform Act,
intend to alter the standards of liability under the [1934] Act."). In light of "the Supreme
Court's hostility toward using subsequent legislative history in interpreting section 10(b) of
the 1934 Act, this colloquy and the entire 'quid pro quo' . . . may be meaningless." Rich-
ard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes of
Action, 84 CoEmtLL L. REv. 1, 55-56 (1998) (footnote omitted). Interestingly, several
paragraphs of the Statement of Managers which further clarified that Congress had not
intended the Reform Act to alter the substantive basis for securities fraud were initially
omitted from the Congressional Record. See 144 CONG. REc. H10,270 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1998).
When these paragraphs were later printed in the Congressional Record, see 144 CONG. REc.
H11,021 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1998), they were followed by a reproduction of a well-known
speech by Representative Bliley, Chairman of the Conference Committee for the Reform
Act, stating that "it is our view that non-intentional conduct can never be sufficient for
liability under section 10(b) of the [1934] Act." Id. As Professor Painter aptly observes, "at
least some individual members of Congress clearly intend[ ] that the legislative history be
as confusing as possible on the question of whether Congress" intended section 21D(b) (2)
to eliminate liability for recklessness. Painter, supra, at 58 n.323.
For an excellent discussion and analysis of the federal preemption debate, see Painter,
supra (concluding that Congress acted prematurely in enacting the Uniform Standards
Act).
330 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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fraud.3 31 In fact, liability for recklessness "is an inherent aspect of
fraud"33 2 and has origins in early common law extending as far back
as the English case of Deny v. Peek.333 Thus, to eliminate securities
fraud liability for reckless misconduct would not only require over-
turning the settled case law of every circuit, but also would uproot
securities fraud from its very foundation.33 4
Eliminating securities fraud liability for recklessness also would
upset the guiding policy objectives of the federal securities laws, which
Congress intended the Reform Act to reestablish. 335 The elimination
of liability for recklessness would upset the delicate balance between
deterring securities fraud and reducing the cost of capital formation
by eliminating abusive securities suits. As the SEC argued, because it
is extremely difficult to establish that a defendant acted with "knowl-
edge" or "conscious intent," such a standard would give corporations
less of an incentive "to conduct. . . full inquir[ies] into potentially
troublesome or embarrassing areas. '336 This lack of incentive would
"greatly erode the deterrent effect" of Rule lOb-5 actions.337 Lastly,
eliminating securities fraud liability for reckless misconduct would
leave both courts and plaintiffs in a state of confusion. Plaintiffs
would have no guidance as to precisely what a complaint must plead
or what they must prove at trial with regard to the scienter element of
securities fraud. Courts, in turn, would have to redevelop criteria by
which to judge both the pleading and substantive aspects of securities
fraud.
331 See In re Baesa Inc. Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (collecting
cases); SEC Amicus Brief, supra note 49, at 5 n.4 (same); Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at
843 n.320 (same).
332 Kuehnle, supra note 59, at 127; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526(b)
cmt.e (1977) (stating that "fraud is prove[n] if it is shown that a false representation has
been made without belief in its truth or recklessly, careless of whether it is true or false");
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 107, at 74142 (5th
ed. 1984) (explaining that courts will find an intent to mislead when "a representation is
made . . . with reckless disregard whether it be true or false").
333 14 App. Cas. 337, 374, 58 L.J. Ch. 864 (1889); see Kuehnle, supra note 59, at 153-59.
334 SeeJohnson, supra note 59, at 736 (eliminating recklessness would be "a clear...
deviation from well-settled common law jurisprudence").
335 See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995), repinted in 1995 U.S.C.CA.N. 679, 683 (stating
that the purpose behind the Reform Act is to "lower the cost of raising capital by combat-
ting [securities litigation] abuses, while maintaining the incentive for bringing meritorious
actions"). Commentators have described the goals of securities laws similarly. For exam-
ple, Phillips and Miller have said:
A properly balanced system would give appropriate weight to two compet-
ing interests: the interest in deterring securities fraud and remedying it
when it occurs, and the interest in assuring that the litigation process is not
used for abusive purposes and does not unfairly target defendants who are
guilty of no wrongdoing
Phillips & Miller, supra note 4, at 1009.




2. As to Whether Section 21D(b)(2) Creates a Pleading Standard More
Stringent Than That of the Second Circuit: The Text of the
Statute Must Control
The question of whether section 21D(b) (2) creates a pleading
standard more stringent than the standard developed by Second Cir-
cuit case law is much more difficult. As previously discussed, a line of
cases has interpreted section 21D(b) (2) to have created a pleading
standard of approximately the same stringency as the Second Circuit's
strong inference standard.338 This line of cases adopted the Second
Circuit's two alternative tests without alteration. A second line of
cases interpreted section 21D(b) (2) to have created a pleading stan-
dard more stringent than that of the Second Circuit and concluded
that the motive and opportunity test no longer presumptively gives
rise to a strong inference of scienter.339 The legislative history behind
section 21D(b) (2) provides equal support for both interpretations of
the provision.
The language of the Senate Report 340 and several comments
made in floor discussions surrounding the House Conference Report
and congressional override of President Clinton's veto341 suggest that
Congress intended courts to look to Second Circuit case law for gui-
dance in construing section 21D(b) (2). Language in the House Con-
ference Report suggesting that the intent of the heightened pleading
requirement was to "strengthen existing pleading requirements," 342
footnote 23,343 and President Clinton's veto message344 all support the
proposition that Congress intended section 21D(b)(2) to be more
stringent than the Second Circuit standard as interpreted in that cir-
cuit's two alternative tests. Supreme Court precedent and tradition
dictate that the committee reports comprise the most definitive ex-
pression of legislative intent,345 but both interpretations of section
21D(b) (2) find support in a committee report: the Senate Report on
the one hand and the House Conference Report on the other. Fur-
thermore, the Supreme Court's Shannon decision, which requires that
congressional intent gleaned from statements made in the legislative
record must be "anchored" in the text of the statute before they are
given interpretive weight,346 offers no guidance either-the relevant
338 See supra Part III.B.1.
339 See supra Part III.B.2(a).
340 See supra text accompanying notes 111-13.
341 See supra notes 148-64 and accompanying text.
342 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740.
343 See id at 48 n.23, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 747 n.23; see also supra text
accompanying note 136 (quoting footnote 23).
344 For the relevant portion of the veto message, see supra text accompanying note
156.
345 See sources cited supra note 295.
346 See Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 583 (1994).
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statements in both the Senate Report and the House Conference Re-
port are equally "anchored" in the strong inference language of sec-
tion 21D(b) (2).
Arguably, the House Conference Report, as the embodiment of
the views of both houses of Congress, is a more reliable source of con-
gressional intent than the Senate Report. As a result, courts should
interpret section 21D (b) (2) to have created a pleading standard more
stringent than that of Second Circuit case law, as indicated by the lan-
guage the conferees used in the House Conference Report. But, an
alternative interpretation of the House Conference Report, stemming
from the split in Second Circuit case law over the exact formulation of
the two alternative tests, undermines this argument. As highlighted in
the congressional floor debate between Senators Dodd and Spec-
ter,347 two distinct formulations of the Second Circuit's two alternative
tests exist: the In re Time Warner Inc. Securities Litigation, Inc. formula-
tion,348 and the Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. formulation. 349
The latter includes qualifying language stipulating that when motive is
not apparent, the plaintiff must plead correspondingly stronger cir-
cumstantial evidence of reckless behavior or knowledge.350 In light of
this split, one can read the crucial language in the House Conference
Report as intending to strengthen existing pleading requirements by
overruling the In re Time Warner formulation, but not the Beck formula-
tion, of the Second Circuit's tests.
Policy considerations also weigh evenly in favor of both interpre-
tations of section 21D (b) (2)'s pleading requirements. The difference
between the two standards is arguably so slight that it will have little
negative impact on either the objectives of the Reform Act or the
larger policy objectives of the federal securities laws.35 1 Moreover, the
stability argument-interpreting section 21D (b) (2) to have effectively
codified Second Circuit case law creates greater coherence in the
law-is not dispositive. It is true that adopting the competing inter-
pretation-the Reform Act's heightened pleading provision creates a
more stringent standard than that developed in Second Circuit case
law-certainly will require courts to start from a "blank slate." How-
347 See supra notes 149-54 and accompanying text.
348 See In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 .3d 259, 268-71 (2d Cir. 1993).
349 See Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1987).
350 See discussion supra Part I.B.3; see also Parker, supra note 69, at 4 (identifying In re
Time Warner and Beck split).
351 See Paul H. Dawes, Pleading Motions Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995, in SECURIES LTGATION 1996, at 69-70 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. B-958, 1996). A central reason why determining the precise stringency of sec-
tion 21D (b) (2) might have only minimal ramifications for complaints pleading securities
fraud is that the application of scienter pleading requirements to a very large degree turns
on the precise facts of each case. For a study of what fact patterns have been held to
establish a "strong inference" of scienter, see ElliotJ. Weiss, The New Securities Fraud Plead-
ing Requirement: Speed Bump or Road Block?, 38 ARIz. L. Ray. 675, 683-90 (1996).
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ever, the already present confusion over the precise formulation of
the Second Circuit test arguably will lead to identical results: neither
plaintiffs nor courts will have guidance as to precisely what a com-
plaint must plead in order to allege sufficiently a strong inference of
scienter.
Thus, the text of section 21D(b) (2)M 352 must control. Nothing in
the text of section 21D(b) (2) refers or directs courts to the Second
Circuit's case law for guidance in interpreting the provision. Accord-
ingly, although reviewing courts may look to the Second Circuit's case
law, and to the two alternative tests developed therein, as a natural
starting point when interpreting the terms "strong inference," that
body of law need not be considered the only starting point. Further,
because this provision should not necessarily be interpreted in rela-
tion to Second Circuit case law, section 21D(b) (2) should not be
thought of as more (or less) stringent than the Second Circuit stan-
dard. This conclusion particularly speaks to those courts that have
interpreted section 21D(b) (2) to be more stringent than the Second
Circuit by holding that it eliminated one of the tests developed in that
circuit's case law-namely, the presumption that pleading motive and
opportunity suffices to establish a "strong inference" of scienter.
Deciding courts are to have significant discretion in interpreting
the precise requirements of section 21D (b) (2): they may equate it
with the Second Circuit's "strong inference" standard and apply both
of that circuit's tests unaltered; they may look to Second Circuit case
law but modify the tests developed therein by eliminating the pre-
sumption that pleading motive and opportunity suffices to establish a
strong inference and measure the weight of such evidence on a case-
by-case basis; or alternatively, they may develop novel requirements
and tests by which to satisfy the strong inference pleading standard.
Thus, the text of section 21D(b) (2) in a sense works a revenge on the
legislature, with its months of drafting and debate, the judiciary, with
its painstaking scrutiny of the resulting legislative history, and to a cer-
tain extent, the bulk of this Note, which tracks both: for this interpre-
tive discretion is the baseline assumption of any court faced with the
text of a new provision.
CONCLUSION
In enacting section 21D(b) (2) of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, Congress sought to achieve a balance between
preventing securities fraud and preventing abusive securities litigation
by heightening the pleading standard for the scienter element of Rule
lOb-5 securities fraud actions. The ambiguous language of section
21D (b) (2), the extensive and confusing legislative history, the concep-
352 See supra text accompanying note 132.
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tual confusion regarding the Second Circuit's case law, and the rela-
tionship between substantive and procedural requirements generally
have led the district courts to arrive at three distinct pleading stan-
dards. A comprehensive evaluation of the interpretive arguments of
the district courts against a thorough analysis of the Reform Act's leg-
islative history leads to the conclusion that section 21D (b) (2) did not
abrogate securities fraud liability for reckless conduct. As for the pre-
cise stringency of the strong inference pleading requirement con-
tained in section 21D(b)(2), however, the text of the statute must
ultimately control.
